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WHAT CAN BE DONE, IF ANYTHING, 
ABOUT THE DANGEROUS PENCHANT OF 
PUBLIC TRUST SCHOLARS TO 
OVEREXTEND JOSEPH SAX’S ORIGINAL 
CONCEPTION: HAVE WE PRODUCED A 
BRIDGE TOO FAR?1 
HOPE M. BABCOCK* 
I suspect I’m not alone in conducting research and writing projects with only 
occasional thoughts about issues of integrity. Yet a few moments’ reflection 
reveals that the scholarly enterprise in the legal academy is riddled with 
integrity issues that we wrestle with and resolve routinely, if only 
semiconsciously.2 
 
This Article examines the tendency of many legal scholars to 
overextend the scope of a previous scholar’s original idea—in this 
case, Professor Joseph Sax’s reconceptualization of the largely 
moribund common law public trust doctrine. Legal scholars are 
induced to write immoderately either to enhance their standing 
within the academic community or, more selflessly, to achieve law 
reform. These expansionist tendencies, however, are not without 
risk—a common law doctrine that becomes too unmoored from its 
historical shackles may lose the support of the courts that is 
required for its implementation. The Article examines whether a 
combination of academic norms and hortatory institutional 
 
 * Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center. This Article grew 
out of a presentation Professor Babcock made to the American Society of 
Environmental History in March 2015. She wishes to thank her colleague 
Professor J. Peter Byrne for lending her his expertise on academic freedom and for 
his hugely helpful substantive contributions to the Article, Professor Zygmunt 
Plater for urging her to write the Article as well as the participants at the March 
ASEH conference for their thoughtful comments, and her research assistant 
Charissa Morningstar for her invaluable assistance in chasing down some of the 
more elusive supporting citations. Professor Babcock has written numerous 
articles on the public trust doctrine as noted at various points in the Article. 
 1  Cf. A BRIDGE TOO FAR (United Artists 1977) (depicting a failed initiative 
in World War II to penetrate German lines and capture several bridges in the 
occupied Netherlands. The title has become an idiom for an act regarded as so 
drastic as to put the whole enterprise in peril.). 
 2  Harold S. Lewis, Jr., Integrity in Research, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 607, 607 
(1992). 
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standards might minimize that risk by encouraging derivative 
scholars to think critically about the impact of their writings on the 
original idea lest they unintentionally jeopardize the initial author’s 
objectives. The purpose of the Article is not to discourage 
derivative, even revisionist scholarship, but only to make second 
generation scholars more reflective about the potential real world 
consequences of their writings. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Forty-five years ago, Professor Joseph Sax published a 
paradigm-shifting article, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural 
Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention,3 in which he 
resuscitated a long dormant property law doctrine rooted in Roman 
and English common law. The public trust doctrine protects, in 
perpetuity, land possessed in common for free and unimpeded 
public access under a trust held by the sovereign. In effect, the 
doctrine acts like an easement that permanently burdens the 
ownership of trust resources with an overriding public interest in 
their preservation. Until the appearance of Professor Sax’s article, 
state courts had limited their use of the public trust doctrine to 
protecting traditional uses of coastal resources and tidelands—like 
navigation, fishing, and oystering—against privatization.4 
Professor Sax suggested that the public trust doctrine should be 
used more broadly to safeguard natural resources because existing 
laws were not protecting the environment.5 By bringing a real 
 
 3  Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: 
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 475 (1970).  
 4  See, e.g., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57–58 (1894) (applying the public 
trust doctrine to block development of private claims in submerged lands); Martin 
v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 413–14 (1842) (applying the public trust 
doctrine to block private claims to shellfish beds); McQueen v. S.C. Coastal 
Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 120 (2003) (applying the public trust doctrine to protect 
coastal tidelands). 
 5  See Joseph L. Sax, Some Thoughts on the Decline of Private Property, 58 
WASH. L. REV. 481, 488 (1983) (describing the public trust doctrine as “largely 
moribund” doctrine which had been “often ignored in the mid-nineteenth 
century”). Like Professor Chayes, who ended the “malaise in procedural 
scholarship” with his article and arguably started an “academic renaissance” by 
“set[ting] the tone for so much procedural scholarship” that followed, Richard 
Marcus, Public Law Litigation and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 
647, 682–83 (1988), Professor Sax also blew new life into property law by 
reconceiving the modern view of property as radical revisionism. See Joseph L. 
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problem to the attention of legal scholars and courts and suggesting 
a possible theoretical basis for a solution,6 the article rose to fame. 
State courts applied the public trust doctrine not only to traditional 
trust resources, like tidelands, but also to lakes,7 beaches,8 
groundwater,9 and even mountains,10 and were protecting not just 
fishing and oystering, but non-traditional uses of trust resources like 
recreation, scientific study, bird watching, and aesthetics.11 
 
Sax, Environmental Law and Its Mortal Enemy: The Rise and Decline of the 
Property Rights Movement, 28 U. HAW. L. REV. 7, 12 (2005).  
 6  See Marcus, supra note 5, at 692 (suggesting among other things that 
Chayes “called the attention of the academy to actual phenomena that need to be 
consider” and “offered an analytical framework that could provide a starting point 
for future work by identifying the problems to be addressed”). 
 7  Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court (Mono Lake), 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 
1983). 
 8  Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).  
 9  Envtl. Law Found. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., No. 34-2010-
80000583, 2014 WL 8843074, at *11 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2014). 
 10  Although the decision in Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm’n, 215 
N.E.2d 114 (Mass. 1966), applying the public trust doctrine to the expansion of a 
ski resort on a mountain top, was issued four years before Sax’s article and, 
therefore, his article cannot claim to have influenced it, he thought the decision 
was particularly important in understanding the broader importance of the public 
trust doctrine because the decision reflected a use of the doctrine to democratize 
the administrative process by placing on administrative agencies “the burden of 
establishing an affirmative case before the legislature in the full light of public 
attention.” Sax, supra note 3, at 499. Sax explains further “[t]hat state’s supreme 
judicial court has penetrated one of the very difficult problems of American 
government-inequality of access to, and over, administrative agencies. It has 
struck directly at low-visibility decision-making, which is the most pervasive 
manifestation of the problem. By a simple but ingenious flick of the doctrinal 
wrist, the court has forced agencies to bear the burden of obtaining specific, overt 
approval of efforts to invade the public trust.” Id. at 498–99. 
 11  See, e.g., Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (Minn. 1893) 
(recognizing recreational uses as within the scope of the public trust doctrine); 
Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 
1972) (applying the public trust doctrine to recreational uses); Marks v. Whitney, 
491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (finding that the public trust doctrine applied to 
collection of scientific information, wildlife habitat, and aesthetics). Not 
surprisingly, the doctrine’s expansion drew critics. See Richard J. Lazarus, 
Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: 
Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 631–33 (1986) 
(complaining the doctrine was the equivalent of an oxymoron in an age of 
environmental protection laws and noting that “modern trends . . . are currently 
weaving a new fabric for natural resources law that is more responsive to current 
social values and the physical characteristics of the resources. By continuing to 
resist a legal system that is otherwise being abandoned, the public trust doctrine 
obscures analysis and renders more difficult the important process of reworking 
natural resources law.”); William D. Araiza, Democracy, Distrust, and the Public 
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Professor Sax’s article quickly gained iconic, nearly totemic, status 
among legal scholars and public interest litigants.12 
In this expansionist tradition, I have argued for using the public 
trust doctrine to prevent the enclosure of the Exclusive Economic 
 
Trust: Process-Based Constitutional Theory, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the 
Search for a Substantive Environmental Value, 45 UCLA L. REV. 385, 402–03 
(1997) (noting worries that expansion of the doctrine makes more acute its 
undemocratic nature, the freedom it gives non-expert courts to second guess 
administrative decisions on complex, highly technical matters, and the danger that 
courts will denigrate private property rights in favor of public trust uses); James 
L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths—A History of the Public Trust 
Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 8–9 (2007) (purporting to debunk the 
popular historical account of the doctrine’s origins and migration to the United 
States); see also James L. Huffman, A Fish out of Water: The Public Trust 
Doctrine in a Constitutional Democracy, 19 ENVTL. L. 527, 567 (1989) (criticizing 
judicial expansion of public trust doctrine); Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the 
Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 711, 722 (1986) (“Despite its popularity, the modern public trust doctrine is 
notoriously vague as to its own subject matter; cases and academic commentaries 
normally fall back on the generality that the content of the public trust is ‘flexible’ 
in response to ‘changing public needs.’”). Even Professor Sax conceded that the 
doctrine’s legal provenance was “dubious.” Sax, supra note 3, at 484 (“Other than 
the rather dubious notion that the general public should be viewed as a property 
holder, there is no well-conceived doctrinal basis that supports a theory under 
which some interests are entitled to special judicial attention and protection.”). 
 12  From 1970, the date of publication of Professor Sax’s public trust article in 
the Michigan Law Review to the time of this writing (3/15/2015), the article has 
been cited in 46 judicial opinions and in 1,179 law journal articles. See E-mails 
from Georgetown University Law Center Reference Librarians to author (Mar. 
25–27, 2015) (on file with author). It is interesting to compare the iconic status of 
1976 article by Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976), which puzzled Professor Richard Marcus sufficiently 
to write his own article trying to understand how a piece that had at best “mixed” 
doctrinal impact, contained little doctrinal analysis, and made no doctrinal 
prescriptions, left many unanswered questions. Marcus, supra note 5, at 648. 
Despite these seeming weaknesses, Professor Marcus concluded that Professor 
Chayes’ article “contributed to new and innovative ways of addressing legal 
issues,” an effect that alludes “most legal academics.” Id. at 640. Professor Sax’s 
1970 Michigan article had none of the weaknesses that Professor Marcus identified 
in Chayes’ work, has had a profound impact on how property is conceived, and 
thus without question has earned the title of being a classic and is, like Chayes’ 
article, a “doctrinal breakthrough” that would be embraced by courts and scholarly 
commentators. Cf. id. at 653. It also helped in both cases that the timing of the 
publication of both articles was perfect for their wide dissemination—for Chayes, 
the growing concern about the social implications of judicial decisions; for Sax, 
the ineffectiveness of common law relief for environmental harms. This resulted 
in readers recognizing that the description of the problem in both situations was 
accurate, and that both offered a “framework for analysis that allowed subsequent 
scholars to pursue the matter further.” Cf. id. at 658–59. 
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Zone (EEZ) for fish ranching,13 to protect wildlife,14 and to block 
application of the takings doctrine to wetlands and coastal 
resources.15 Recently, I advocated its use to protect Palisades Inter-
State Park from visual pollution created by the construction of a 
commercial building near the park’s boundaries.16 In all of these 
articles, I principally relied on Professor Sax’s work to justify the 
infinite malleability of the doctrine. But upon the publication of my 
Palisades Park article, and in light of recent litigation using the 
public trust doctrine as a legal basis for compelling the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency to limit greenhouse gas 
emissions,17 I began to question the doctrine’s expansion. 
Rereading Professor Sax’s 1970 Michigan article, I focused for 
the first time on his concerns about pushing the doctrine too far—
his worries about potentially “squeez[ing] it to death”18 and ill-
advisedly inviting “sharp confrontations between courts and 
legislatures.”19 Professor Sax’s caution in inviting the courts to 
engage in what had been thought the domain of the other branches 
of government20 and his recognition that the doctrine “has no life on 
 
 13  See generally Hope M. Babcock, Grotius, Ocean Fish Ranching, and the 
Public Trust Doctrine: Ride ‘Em Charlie Tuna, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (2007). 
 14  Hope M. Babcock, Does Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council Protect 
Where the Wild Things Are? Of Beavers, Bob-O-Links, and Other Things that Go 
Bump in the Night, 85 IOWA L. REV. 849, 889–98 (2000). 
 15  Hope M. Babcock, Has the Supreme Court Finally Drained the Swamp of 
Takings Jurisprudence: The Impact of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council 
on Wetlands and Coastal Barrier Beaches, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 49–55 
(1995).  
 16  Hope M. Babcock, Is Using the Public Trust Doctrine to Protect Public 
Parkland from Visual Pollution Justifiable Doctrinal Creep?, 42 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
1, 24–35 (2015). 
 17  See Alec L. ex rel Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 Fed. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(dismissing suit by two California teenagers and two environmental organizations 
to compel EPA to cap greenhouse gas emissions on the ground that the public trust 
doctrine does not establish federal question jurisdiction). 
 18  Sax, supra note 3, at 553. 
 19  Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust from Its Historical Shackles, 14 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185, 194 (1980); see also Joseph Sax, Helpless Giants: The 
National Parks and the Regulation of Private Lands, 75 MICH. L. REV. 239, 259 
(1976) (questioning the application of the public trust doctrine to compel Congress 
to enact protective regulation of national parks). 
 20  See, e.g., Sax, supra note 3, at 551 (“This article has been concerned largely 
with the judicial function only because it has been so widely believed that the task 
is essentially one for legislative and administrative action and that the scope for 
judicial action is limited to remedying blatant and express departures from specific 
statutory standards.”); see also id. at 558 (“Understandably courts are reluctant to 
intervene in the processes of any given agency.”). 
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its own and no intrinsic content”21 reflects his awareness of the risk 
of taking a common law doctrine too far from its historical roots 
where it could lose the courts and legislatures that enable its 
application and discourage future uses of the doctrine. But, 
overextension of the doctrine also raises more inchoate concerns 
about scholarship, particularly any obligations of subsequent 
scholars to heed the pleas of the original authors to protect their 
ideas so as not to squander the opportunities offered.22 While 
scholars must continue to build upon the work of their predecessors, 
they should do so with thoughtful circumspection and an awareness 
of the original author’s concerns. When the architect of an idea 
urges prudence in regard to the danger of overextending a doctrine, 
caution should be cast aside only when the benefits are warranted.23 
This Article examines these concerns in the context of the 
public trust doctrine, in the hope of learning whether limits should 
be placed on how far subsequent users of another’s original idea 
should go in expanding its reach and how such limits, if warranted, 
might be imposed. Part I briefly provides some background on the 
public trust doctrine and Professor Sax’s public trust scholarship, 
including his concerns about overextending the doctrine. Part II 
discusses how courts have expanded the doctrine beyond its original 
geographic scope and purpose, as well as some representative 
scholarship on the wisdom or folly of what the courts are doing. 
Parts III and IV of the Article examine academic norms and the 
pressure of outside institutions as possible restraints on scholars 
from going beyond what the original author envisioned. 
The Article concludes that, while there are no definitive 
solutions to the problems raised here, some help may lie in legal 
scholars internalizing a new academic norm cabining their tendency 
to overreach. But internalization of any new norm is unlikely to 
happen without outside assistance—for example, having a 
professional association republish the new norm as a hortatory 
 
 21  Sax, supra note 3, at 521. 
 22  See Marcus, supra note 5, at 693 (saying that Owen Fiss, among others, has 
“gone much further than Chayes in constructing alternative theories”). 
 23  I am indebted to my colleague Zygmunt Plater for framing this obligation 
as one of “thoughtful circumspection” and “a duty to society, that the legal 
system’s ongoing recognition and integration of significant public trust doctrine 
values” be carefully shepherded, “treating Joe as the initiator of a remarkably 
important doctrine lying latent within our legal system.” Email from Zygmunt 
Plater, Professor of Law, B.C.L. Sch., to author (Mar. 25, 2015) (on file with 
author). 
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standard or academic institutions providing supportive incentives. 
As the unintended risks scholars face when they borrow the work of 
others to justify their own contribution to the scholarly literature are 
identified, they will recognize they have some form of social duty 
to think more deeply about those risks and how to minimize them 
before they proceed.24 
I. A MODEST LITTLE IDEA AND PROFESSOR SAX’S VIEW OF HOW IT 
COULD BE USED 
“The public trust . . . is based on a set of modest beliefs . . . a belief that 
words like ‘trust’ ought to be taken seriously.”25 
The essence of the public trust doctrine is the idea that the 
sovereign holds certain common properties in trust in perpetuity for 
the free and unimpeded use of the general public.26 The public’s 
rights in trust resources are never lost, and neither the government 
nor private individuals can alienate or otherwise adversely affect 
those rights unless for a comparable public purpose.27 One of the 
core protected rights is that of public access to trust resources.28 
 
 24  By way of disclaimer, this Article is largely impressionistic. At most, it 
resembles the “armchair empiricism” that Richard Marcus attributed to Abram 
Chayes, supra note 12, at 1281. I also recognize that the line between pursuing 
original scholarship and ‘going too far’ is neither clear nor hard, which is why the 
Article does not try to define where that line is. Rather, its purpose is to alert its 
readers to a possible problem and to urge them to write more consciously to 
minimize those consequences; not to refrain from writing at all. 
 25  Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts 
on the Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 471–72 
(1989). 
 26  See Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 351, 351 (1998) (“Until it was revived and re-invented by Sax, the 
doctrine held that some resources, particularly lands beneath navigable waters or 
washed by the tides, are either inherently the property of the public at large, or are 
at least subject to a kind of inherent easement for certain public purposes. Those 
purposes are foremost navigation and travel, to a lesser extent fishing, and lesser 
still recreation and public gatherings.”); see also Sax, supra note 3, at 477 (saying 
public trust doctrine requires that first “property subject to the trust must not only 
be used for a public purpose, but it must be held available for use by the general 
public; second, the property may not be sold, even for a fair cash equivalent; and 
third, the property must be maintained for particular types of uses”). 
 27  Babcock, supra note 14, at 889–98; see also Mary Christina Wood, 
Protecting the Wildlife Trust: A Reinterpretation of Section 7 of the Endangered 
Species Act, 34 ENVTL. L. 605, 612 (2004) (“[G]overnment trustees are required 
to preserve wildlife assets and protect them against damage.”). 
 28  See Gary D. Meyers, Variation on a Theme: Expanding the Public Trust 
Doctrine to Include Protection of Wildlife, 19 ENVTL. L. 723, 731–34 (1989) 
(noting that, “[i]n essence, the courts protect access rights to public trust resources” 
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The public trust doctrine places on governments “an 
affirmative, ongoing duty to safeguard the long-term preservation 
of those resources for the benefit of the general public.”29 As such, 
the doctrine fundamentally limits government power30 on behalf of 
both present and future individuals, and it enjoins the government 
to manage trust resources for public benefit, not private gain.31 
Government agencies have the non-rescindable power to revoke 
private uses of trust resources that are inconsistent with the 
doctrine.32 That power is equivalent to a permanent easement over 
trust resources that burdens their ownership with an overriding 
public interest in their preservation.33 This is not to say the public 
trust resources can never be alienated;34 indeed, lands impressed 
with the public trust can be transferred to private owners, but only 
if the conveyance will serve the public interest in those resources 
and will not interfere with trust uses in the non-conveyed land.35 
 
And that the public trust doctrine is a “transcendent legal principle” with “roots . . . 
in natural law”); see also Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892) 
(affirming that since absolute private dominion over property impressed with the 
public trust interferes with public access, it can never be granted unless it is in the 
public interest to do so). 
 29  Richard M. Frank, The Public Trust Doctrine: Assessing Its Recent Past & 
Charting Its Future, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 665, 667 (2012); see also J. Peter 
Byrne, The Public Trust Doctrine, Legislation, and Green Property: A Future 
Convergence?, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 915, 918 (2012) (“Public trust rights are 
understood to precede and constrain legislative action to a larger extent than do 
private property rights.”). 
 30  See Mary Christina Wood, “You Can’t Negotiate with a Beetle”: 
Environmental Law for the New Ecological Age, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J. 167, 201 
(2010); see also Wood, supra note 27, at 612 (explaining that this capacity to 
“constrain the natural tendency of governmental officials to exhaust resources in 
the present generation” acts like “a normative anchor . . . geared towards 
sustaining society for generations to come”). 
 31  See Wood, “You Can’t Negotiate with a Beetle,” supra note 30, at 201. 
 32  See Babcock, supra note 14, at 892.  
 33  Id. at 893 (“One cannot construct a common law canon more offensive to 
the notion of absolute private rights in property than the public trust doctrine.”); 
see also Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 453 (A state “can no more abdicate its trust 
over property in which the whole people are interested . . . so as to leave them 
entirely under the use and control of private parties . . . than it can abdicate its 
police powers in the administration of government and the preservation of the 
peace”). 
 34   See Sax, supra note 19, at 186 (“[I]t can hardly be the basis of any sensible 
legal doctrine that change itself is illegitimate.”); see also id. (“[I]t is inconceivable 
that the trust doctrine should be viewed as a rigid prohibition, preventing all 
dispositions of trust property or utterly freezing as of a given moment the uses to 
which those properties have traditionally been put.”). 
 35  Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 453 (“The control of the State for the 
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Professor Sax considered the tension between allowing some 
conversions of trust resources to accommodate modern public needs 
and protecting historical uses of trust resources as “the central 
problem of public trust controversies.”36 
According to Professor Sax, at the doctrine’s “heart” was more 
than “just a set of rules about tidelands, a restraint on alienation by 
the government or an historical inquiry into the circumstances of 
long-forgotten grants.”37 He thought that the doctrine could 
contribute to intelligent management of natural resources, especially 
in the absence of laws promoting that end.38 As his 1970 article 
predated most of the federal laws protecting natural systems, the 
doctrine could create breathing room for those systems until such 
laws were adopted.39 He also saw in the doctrine the means to avoid 
 
purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as to such parcels as are used in 
promoting the interest of the public therein, or can be disposed of without any 
substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters remaining.”); 
see also Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine County (Mono Lake 
Case), 658 P.2d 709, 724 (Cal. 1983) (“The public trust is more than an affirmation 
of state power to use public property for public purposes. It is an affirmation of 
the duty of the state to protect the people’s common heritage[,] . . . surrendering 
that right . . . only in rare cases when the abandonment of that right is consistent 
with the purpose of the trust.”).  
 36  Sax, supra note 3, at 495. He also noted that courts generally “look with 
considerable skepticism upon any governmental conduct which is calculated either 
to reallocate [a public] resource to more restricted uses or to subject public uses to 
the self-interest of private parties” because one raison d’être for governments is to 
provide widely available public services like schools, police protection, and parks. 
Id. at 490. 
 37  Sax, supra note 19, at 186. 
 38  Sax, supra note 3, at 474 (“Of all the concepts known to American law, 
only the public trust doctrine seems to have the breadth and substantive content 
which might make it useful as a tool of general application for citizens seeking to 
develop a comprehensive legal approach to resource management problems.”); see 
also Harry R. Bader, Antaeus and the Public Trust Doctrine: A New Approach to 
Substantive Environmental Protection in the Common Law, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. 
L. REV. 749, 761 (1992) (“The marriage of absolute ecological protection with 
absolute access for the purpose of utilizing natural resources comes the closest to 
the true essence of the public trust doctrine.”); Rose, supra note 26, at 355 (“Sax’s 
goal was to loosen the public trust doctrine from its historical connection with 
navigation and waterways, and turn the doctrine instead into a more general devise 
for managing change and recognizing community values in diffuse resources.”). 
Indeed, Sax believed recognition of “long-standing public uses have an important 
place” in any judicial analysis of the “justness of property claims” and would 
“integrate legal doctrine and fundamental principles of intelligent resource 
management, instead of treating basic social decisions as if they were merely the 
province of a title examiner.” Sax, supra note 19, at 194. 
 39  Cf. Sax, supra note 19, at 188–89 (discussing the role of the public trust 
doctrine in assuring that “the legal system is pursuing a substantive goal identical 
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“destabilizing disappointment of expectations held in common,”40 
when less severe intrusions might be pursued.41 He identified a 
government process benefit to the doctrine’s application because it 
could democratize agency and legislative decision-making by 
requiring publication of decisions that lessened the doctrine’s 
protective effect.42 He saw in public trust law “not so much a 
substantive set of standards for dealing with the public domain as a 
technique by which courts may mend perceived imperfections in the 
legislative and administrative process.”43 Thus, in Professor Sax’s 
mind, the modern public trust doctrine potentially served many 
needs.44 
But, at the same time, Professor Sax worried about uses of the 
doctrine that might provoke “sharp confrontations between courts 
and legislatures.” 45 He counseled advocates not to search for a 
constitutional mandate for the doctrine, but instead to use it to 
encourage courts to search for “less disruptive alternatives below 
the constitutional level.”46 Yet, at the same time, Professor Sax 
believed the doctrine contained “the seeds of ideas whose 
importance is only beginning to be perceived, and that the doctrine’s 
use in encouraging “needed legal development, can hardly be 
doubted.”47 However, even at his most enthusiastic, Professor Sax 
 
for the management of natural resources”). 
 40  Id. 
 41  Id. at 193 (the public trust doctrine insulated “social, economic, and 
ecological systems from avoidable destabilization and disruption”). 
 42  Sax, supra note 3, at 498; see also Marcus, supra note 5, at 663 (discussing 
Judge Lord’s decision to allow individuals to intervene in United States v. Reserve 
Mining Co., 60 F.R.D. 406 (D. Minn. 1972), because a court should allow the 
people who might be affected by a decree to be heard).  
 43  Sax, supra note 3, at 509; see also id. at 521 (“The ‘public trust’ has no life 
of its own and no intrinsic content. It is no more—and no less—than a name courts 
give to their concerns about the insufficiencies of the democratic process.”). 
 44  Professor Rose comments that Professor Sax “effectively treated the public 
trust as a common-law version of the then-novel hard look doctrine for 
environmental impacts.” Rose, supra note 26, at 355. 
 45  Sax, supra note 19, at 194. 
 46  Id. at 193–94. But see George P. Smith II & Michael W. Sweeney, The 
Public Trust Doctrine and Natural Law; Emanations within a Penumbra, 33 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 307, 313 (2006) (commenting that “although the Supreme 
Court has never expressly stated so, the concept of the public trust and the resulting 
affirmative duties seem to emanate from the Constitution. While other 
interpretations of the public trust source exist, this is the most reasonable 
explanation considering the ‘heavy overlay of constitutional doctrine’ concerning 
watercourse regulation”). 
 47  Id. at 485. Professor Sax envisioned many uses of the public trust doctrine, 
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viewed the doctrine primarily as a judicial goad to legislatures to fill 
gaps in the web of laws protecting the environment, not for courts 
to undertake that gap-filling role themselves.48 
II. HOW COURTS TOOK THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN THEIR 
TEETH AND BOLTED 
Humpty Dumpty sat on a wall, 
Humpty Dumpty had a great fall; 
All the king’s horses and all the king’s men 
Couldn’t put Humpty together again.49 
In its original incarnation, the public trust doctrine’s scope and 
its uses were quite narrow. The doctrine’s original incarnation 
covered only that “aspect of the public domain below the low-water 
mark on the margin of the sea and the great lakes, the waters over 
those lands, and the waters within rivers and streams of any 
consequence.”50 Largely in response to Professor Sax’s suggestion 
that the doctrine could be used to address a variety of environmental 
harms,51 the courts expanded the traditional doctrine to protect new 
 
such as enhancing the transparency of governmental decision-making, creating 
space for natural systems to adapt before protective laws were adopted, and 
avoiding destabilizing public expectations about communal resources and the need 
for less damaging alternatives to their destruction. See id. at 556–65 (discussing 
the role of the courts in applying the public trust doctrine and the various uses to 
which the doctrine can be put). 
 48  Sax, supra note 3, at 544 (noting that without “pressing for direct 
confrontation between the court and the legislature, a considerable opportunity for 
fruitful judicial intervention can be created”). 
 49  WALTER CRANE, MOTHER GOOSE’S NURSERY RHYMES 49 (1877). 
 50  Sax, supra note 3, at 556.  
 51  Id. at 556–57 (“[I]t seems that the delicate mixture of procedural and 
substantive protections which the courts have applied in conventional public trust 
cases would be equally applicable and equally appropriate in controversies 
involving air pollution, the dissemination of pesticides, the location of rights of 
way for utilities, and strip mining or wetland filling on private lands in a state 
where governmental permits are required.”); see also Byrne, supra note 29, at 918 
(“Sax saw the public trust doctrine primarily as a device whereby courts could 
correct the tendency of parochial administrative agencies and legislatures to 
respond to well organized minorities and slight the public interest in natural 
resource protection.”). Sax also thought the doctrine might be applied to the poor 
and consumer groups who are also “often particularly dramatic examples of 
diffuse public interests and contain all their problems of equality in the political 
and administrative process” that arise in cases involving natural resources. Sax, 
supra note 3, at 557. He goes on to say, “Only time will reveal the appropriate 
limits of the public trust doctrine as a useful judicial instrument.” Id.  
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trust resources,52 such as dry sand beaches,53 inland lakes,54 
groundwater,55 dry riverbeds,56 wildlife,57 and urban parks.58 Gone 
was the traditional link to navigable water or tidelands.59 The courts 
 
 52  See generally Frank, supra note 29 (discussing the following and other 
modern public trust cases). 
 53  Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n., 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984) 
(“[R]ecognizing the increasing demand for our State’s beaches and the dynamic 
nature of the public trust doctrine, we find that the public must be given both access 
to and use of privately-owned dry sand areas as reasonably necessary.”); see also 
Frank, supra note 29, at 674 (citing Matthews as in essence giving the public a 
“trust-based easement right to cross privately-owned  shoreline property to get to 
the ocean”); Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 
120 (N.J. 2005) (affirming Matthews and declaring that the public had a right to 
sunbathe and picnic on the privately-owned sand). 
 54  Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine County (Mono Lake 
Case), 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983). 
 55  In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 F.3d 409, 445–47 (applying public 
trust doctrine to groundwater); Envtl. Law Found. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 
No. 34-2010-80000583, 2014 WL 8843074, at *10 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 
2014) (applying the public trust doctrine to groundwater hydrologically connected 
to navigable river). 
 56  See, e.g., Lawrence v. Clark Cty., 254 P.3d 606 (Nev. 2011) (applying the 
doctrine to some former riverbeds). 
 57  Cal. Trout v. Superior Court, 266 Cal. Rptr. 788, 801–02 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1990).  
 58  Brooklyn Park Comm’rs v. Armstrong, 45 N.Y. 234 (N.Y. 1871) (applying 
the public trust doctrine to block Brooklyn from transferring land which it had 
taken title to without approval of the State legislature); Williams v. Gallatin, 128 
N.E. 121, 122 (1920) (stating that parks need not be open spaces, but “no objects, 
however worthy, such as court houses and school houses which have no 
connection with park purposes should be permitted to encroach upon it without 
legislative authority plainly conferred”). 
 59  See, e.g., Hoffman v. City of Pittsburgh, 75 A.2d 649 (Pa. 1950) (upholding 
an injunction against sale of public square for development based on public trust 
doctrine); In re Conveyance of 1.2 Acres of Bangor Mem’l Park to Bangor Area 
Sch. Dist., 567 A.2d 750 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989) (blocking attempted transfer of 
parklands for construction of an elementary school); Williams, 128 N.E. 121 
(invalidating a ten-year lease of part of Central Park for a museum for 
impermissibly diverting park resources without the state legislature’s approval); 
Ackerman v. Steisel, 480 N.Y.S.2d 556, 558 (App. Div. 1984) (ordering removal 
of city sanitation equipment from a park); Ellington Constr. v. Zoning Bd. of 
Appeals, 152 A.D.2d 365, 378–79 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (prohibiting the re-
conveyance of parkland for redevelopment); Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm’n of 
Chi., 263 N.E.2d 11, 19 (Ill. 1970) (allowing conveyance of two percent of 
Washington Park for a middle school and recreational facilities leased to the 
Chicago Park District only after showing that public rights in remaining parkland 
protected and use was for public purpose); Big Sur Props. v. Mott, 62 Cal. App. 
3d 99, 103 (1976) (revoking permit to cross public parkland to access private 
property); Save the Welwood Murray Mem’l Library Comm. v. City Council, 215 
Cal. App. 3d 1003, 1017 (1989) (invoking public trust doctrine to block conversion 
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simultaneously expanded protected uses of trust resources from 
navigation, commerce, and fishing to include a variety of passive 
public uses of those resources, including recreation, bird watching, 
aesthetics, and gathering of scientific information.60 These doctrinal 
leaps all occurred in the penumbra of multiple environmental laws 
at all levels of government.61 Arguably, Congress has filled many of 
the gaps that faced Professor Sax when he wrote his Michigan article 
or, at least, has demonstrated that it was capable of doing so.62 
Legal scholars participated in this doctrinal revisionist trend,63 
writing enthusiastically about potential new uses of the doctrine, not 
unintentionally providing support for litigants eager to expand the 
doctrine’s protective reach.64 Soon proponents of the doctrine were 
 
of a public library to improve access to nearby commercial areas). 
 60  Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (holding public trust 
doctrine protects environmental and ecological values); Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 
N.W. 1139, 1143 (Minn. 1893) (first state recognizing public recreation rights as 
being within the scope of the public trust doctrine); Borough of Neptune City v. 
Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972) (applying public trust 
doctrine to recreational use, with “no difficulty in finding that, in this latter half of 
the twentieth century, the public rights in tidal lands are not limited to the ancient 
prerogatives of navigation and fishing, but extend . . . to recreational uses, 
including bathing, swimming and other shore activities. The public trust doctrine, 
like all common law principles, should not be considered fixed or static, but should 
be molded and extended to meet changing conditions and needs of the public it 
was created to benefit”); see also Raritan Baykeeper Inc. v. City of New York, 984 
N.Y.S.2d 634 (Sup. Ct. 2013) (holding that the use of a municipal park for solid 
waste processing (leaf composting) was an alienation of park resources that, under 
the public trust doctrine, could only be authorized by the Legislature). 
 61  Professor Sax attributed the malleability of the public trust doctrine to the 
fact that property is “inextricably part of a network of relationships that is neither 
limited to, nor usefully defined by, the property boundaries with which the legal 
system is accustomed to dealing.” Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and 
Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 152 (1971); see also Charles A. Reich, The New 
Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771 (1964) (“Property is not a natural right but a 
deliberate construction by society.”). 
 62  See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1972); Solid Waste Disposal 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1976), Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1977); Coastal 
Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1451 (1972). An example of a gap that has 
not yet been legislatively or administratively filed is global climate change, which 
has provoked the use of the public trust doctrine by environmental litigators to 
goad EPA into filling a perceived legislative gap. See, e.g., Alec L. ex rel Loorz v. 
McCarthy, 561 Fed. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 63  Ironically, Professor Sax commented on another type of “radical 
revisionism,” namely the efforts of the property rights movement “to radically 
restructure property law.”  See  Sax, supra note 5, at 11–12. 
 64  See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Comment, Public Trust and Distrust: The Theoretical 
Implications of the Public Trust Doctrine for Natural Resource Management, 
31 ENVTL. L. 477, 480 (2001) (“Scholars and practitioners have responded to 
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advocating that it be applied to “wildlife, parks, cemeteries, and 
works of fine art,”65 and even to the atmosphere.66 By far the most 
adventuresome of public trust scholars writing today, Professor 
Mary Christina Wood has suggested that there is a “planetary public 
trust in the atmosphere,”67 and has promoted her concept in a series 
 
Sax’s call and have advocated extending public trust protection to wildlife, parks, 
cemeteries, and even works of fine art.”); Eric T. Freyfogle, Ownership and 
Ecology, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1269, 1289–90 (1993) (arguing for expanding 
the settings in which the legal concept of public trust could be applied); see 
generally Alison Rieser, Ecological Preservation as a Public Property Right: An 
Emerging Doctrine in Search of a Theory, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 393 (1991) 
(explaining various theoretical bases for expansion of the doctrine to protect 
naturally functioning ecosystems); Patrick S. Ryan, Application of the Public-
Trust Doctrine and Principles of Natural Resource Management to 
Electromagnetic Spectrum, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 285 (2004) 
(proposing the application of the public trust doctrine to the electromagnetic 
spectrum to improve public access and perhaps return some of the spectrum that 
has been allocated to special interests back to the public). 
 65  Erin Ryan, supra note 64, at 480 (“Scholars and practitioners have 
responded to Sax’s call and have advocated extending public trust protection to 
[cultural assets].”). 
 66  See, e.g., Frank, supra note 29, at 679  (“In many ways, our air resources 
would seem the natural resource most susceptible of treatment as a foundational 
public trust resource. After all, it is by its physical nature incapable of private 
‘ownership,’ and science has demonstrated how the private degradation of air 
quality can have demonstrable, harmful impacts on public health and aesthetic 
values.”). Some courts have not found the idea to be so far-fetched. See, e.g., Payne 
v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 93 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973) (citing public trust doctrine 
and Pennsylvania Constitution as sources of mandate to preserve “clean air . . . 
[and] the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the 
environment.”); Save Ourselves Inc., v. Louisiana, 452 So. 2d. 1152, 1154 (La. 
1984) (recognizing public trust doctrine potentially protects all natural resources, 
including air). 
 67  Byrne, supra note 29 at 926 (citing Mary Christina Wood, Atmospheric 
Trust Litigation, in CLIMATE CHANGE READER 4–6 (W.H. Rodgers, Jr. & M. 
Robinson-Dorn eds. 2009), https://law.uoregon.edu/images/uploads/ 
entries/atmo.pdf.); see also Chris Evans, Atmospheric Trust Litigation, W. COAST 
ENVTL. L. (June 14, 2011), http://wcel.org/resources/environmental-law-
alert/atmospheric-trust-litigation (discussing litigation filed by environmental 
activists in 2011 against all 50 states and the federal government for their failure 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, a deficiency plaintiffs claim violates public 
trust principles). Professor Wood’s articles and the ensuing litigation maintain 
their creative reading of the public trust doctrine is merely applying existing 
doctrine and that their capacious interpretation of that doctrine is strongly 
supported by precedent. See David Cole, Agon at Agora: Creative Misreadings in 
the First Amendment Tradition, 95 YALE L.J. 857, 868–69 (1986) (“The tension 
between proffering a new vision and following the precedential line, between 
greatness and legitimacy, is distilled at the point where the justice, though a 
misreading, simultaneously revises the law and insists that he or she is doing 
nothing more than applying the law.”). 
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of lawsuits around the country.68 Chafing against a restrictive view 
of the doctrine’s scope, she has also argued for the doctrine’s 
“complete re-conceptualization,” proposing that it be converted into 
“Nature’s Trust.”69 Her eagerness to expand the doctrine is born out 
of justified frustration at the inability of both Congress and the 
Administration to respond effectively to the crisis of global climate 
change.70 
But some scholars sounded a warning about the doctrine’s 
expansion, criticizing its broad use to protect the environment 
precisely because doing this ignores the doctrine’s traditional 
roots.71 Among them is Professor William Araiza, who worries that 
this expansionist trend has put into question the doctrine’s “precise 
legal foundation, its democratic legitimacy, and judicial competence 
 
 68  See James Hansen, Legal Action, OUR CHILDRENS’ TRUST, 
http://ourchildrenstrust.org/legal (last visited Oct. 15, 2015) (providing links to 
lawsuits filed across nation). To date, these lawsuits have been largely 
unsuccessful. See, e.g., Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 17 (D.D.C. 2012) 
(dismissing claim against EPA Administrator for failing to protect the atmosphere 
under the public trust doctrine for failing to state a claim because, since that claim 
is grounded in state law, it does not raise a federal question). But see Forster v. 
Washington Dep’t of Ecology, No. 14-2-25295-1 (Wash. Super. Ct. King Cnty. 
filed Nov. 19, 2015). 
 69  Wood, “You Can’t Negotiate with a Beetle,” supra note 30, at 202–03 
(“Courts have repeatedly invited expansion of the doctrine by emphasizing its 
flexibility to accommodate emerging societal needs. Nature’s Trust invites a re-
conceptualization of the public trust doctrine . . . .”); id. at 205 (arguing that 
limiting public trust to streambeds and water-related areas is “superficial and at 
odds with the overriding truth of nature that all ecological resources are 
interconnected and interdependent”); see generally, Mary Christina Wood, 
Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the Environment for 
Present and Future Generations (Part 1): Ecological Realism and the Need for a 
Paradigm Shift, 39 ENVTL. L. 43 (2009) (calling for the public trust doctrine to be 
expanded to system of protection for natural resources against threats of climate 
change and ecological collapse). In this Professor Wood is engaging in a typical 
legal analytical methodology, reinterpreting and tailoring “a standing body of law” 
to fit “novel facts.” Cole, supra note 67, at 858; RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 
8 (1986) (discussing the differences in opinion over whether judges should “follow 
the law and not improve upon it”). 
 70  See DWORKIN, supra note 69, at 53 (“[A]ll interpretation strives to make an 
object the best it can be, as an instance of some assumed enterprise, and that 
interpretation takes different forms in different contexts only because different 
enterprises engage different standards of value or success”); see generally Michael 
P. Vandenbergh & Kaitlin T. Raimi, Climate Change: Leveraging Legacy, 42 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 139 (2015) (discussing the use of social norms to motivate private 
individuals and companies to fill the gap in climate change governance). 
 71  Smith II & Sweeney, supra note 46, at 342 (“Expansion of the public trust 
doctrine for no other reason than to protect the environment simply ignores the 
economic precedent established by the original doctrine itself.”). 
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to implement it.”72 Professor Peter Byrne has qualms that these 
doctrinal leaps expose “the public trust doctrine’s greatest 
weakness: it simply claims too much.”73 
One of the greatest worriers about overextending the doctrine, 
however, was Professor Sax. He warned lawyers not to exceed a 
court’s comfort level because they will not intervene if plaintiffs 
“press for direct confrontation between the court and the 
legislature.”74 To Professor Sax, “[a] litigation theory which begins 
with a sophisticated analysis of public trust principles—setting out 
alternatives for the achievement of a reasonable development of 
trust lands with minimal infringement of public use—is likely to 
obtain a far more sympathetic response from the bench than is one 
which takes a rigorous legal principle and squeezes it to death.”75 
He even set out criteria for when doctrinal expansion was 
appropriate.76 The fact that legal scholars, like the author, have 
 
 72  William D. Araiza, The Public Trust Doctrine as an Interpretive Canon, 45 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 693, 711 (2012); see also id. at 738 (identifying as a paradox 
of the doctrine that at one time it is both “a deeply felt principle established in 
venerable law, but at the same time, an incompletely worked-out legal doctrine 
that, in its more aggressive forms, threatens to provide courts with wide-ranging 
authority poorly cabined by legal rules”); id. at 737–38 (“[The expansion] may 
also test the competence of courts [which must] . . . decide complex land use and 
ecosystem-management questions, and evaluate the real costs and benefits 
associated with conflicting resource uses.”). But see Sax, supra note 3, at 552 
(finding courts perfectly able to distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate 
“dealings with trust lands”). 
 73  Byrne, supra note 29, at 927; see also Seth Jaffe, Two Strikes Against 
Common Law Approaches to Climate Change: The Atmosphere Is Not a Public 
Trust, L. & ENV’T (June 1, 2012), http://www.lawandenvironment.com/2012/06/ 
01/two-strikes-against-commonlaw-approaches-to-climate-change-the-atmosphe-
re-is-not-a-public-trust/ (decrying the use of the public trust doctrine to compel 
agencies to protect the atmosphere from climate change by reducing carbon 
dioxide emissions). 
 74  Sax, supra note 3, at 544; see also Sax, Liberating the Public Trust from Its 
Historical Shackles, supra note 19, at 194 (warning that “sharp confrontations 
between courts and legislatures should be avoided wherever possible, suggesting 
instead that courts can encourage legislatures to “search for less disruptive 
decisions below the constitutional level,” can also “assure” decisions made by 
administrative agencies cannot impair the public trust “in the absence of explicit, 
fully considered legislative judgments,” and protect trust resources from pressures 
from private landowners by being mindful of “the history of common rights”). 
 75  Sax, supra note 3, at 553; see also id. at 566 (“If lawyers and their clients 
are willing to ask for less than the impossible, the judiciary can be expected to play 
an increasingly important and fruitful role in safeguarding the public trust.”). 
 76  See id. at 484–85 (setting out three criteria for determining whether the 
public trust doctrine should be expanded—”certain interests are so intrinsically 
important to every citizen that their free availability tends to mark the society as 
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ignored his concerns about overextending the doctrine at the same 
time we relied on his work for our own scholarship is what 
stimulated this Article. 
III. PROBLEMS CREATED WHEN SCHOLARLY IDEAS ARE 
OVEREXTENDED77 
Scholarship is legal academe’s jade; we sing its glories and genuflect 
before it, bedizen it with jewels and then demean it by pretending to make it 
the gate keeper of the profession. It becomes the price we must pay to be a 
law professor, rather than the prime privilege of that calling. And, most 
justly, it reciprocates in kind, by forcing us to accept as scholarship work 
that is little more than ritualized diligence. 78 
Author and scholar Umberto Eco defends what he calls the 
“interpretative virtue of ‘moderateness.’”79 Some scholars who 
value moderation believe that judges who follow a minimalist 
interpretative approach reduce the opportunities for clashes with the 
legislative branch over their own interpretative judgments.80 
 
one of citizens rather than of serfs,’” “certain interests are so particularly the gifts 
of nature’s bounty that they ought to be reserved for the whole of the populace,” 
and “certain uses have a peculiarly public nature that makes their adaptation to 
private use inappropriate”); see also Babcock, supra note 16 at 24–31 (applying 
Professor Sax’s criteria to justify expansion of the doctrine to protect scenic views 
of Palisades Inter-State Park). 
 77  The author is not choosing between various interpretations of the public 
trust doctrine, nor arguing that any specific interpretation of the doctrine is wrong 
or even “objectively better than another,” but rather that any interpretation of the 
doctrine that ignores the risks set out in this Part is problematic and should be 
discouraged. Cf. DWORKIN, supra note 69, at 76 (“Can one interpretative view be 
objectively better than another when they are not merely different, bringing out 
different and complementary aspects of a complex work, but contradictory, when 
the content of one includes the claim that the other is wrong?”). 
 78  Kenneth Lasson, Commentary, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit 
of Truth and Tenure, HARV. L. REV. 926, 934, n.43 (1990) (quoting Bard, 
Scholarship, 31 LEGAL EDUC. 242 (1981)). 
 79  Robert F. Blomquist, Overinterpreting Law, 116 PENN STATE L. REV. 1081, 
1115 (2012) (quoting UMBERTO ECO, Interpretation and History, in 
INTERPRETATION AND OVERINTERPRETATION 236, (Stefan Collini ed. 1992)).  
 80  Id. at 1117 (quoting MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 150 
(2008)); see also Farber, infra note 86, at 377 (quoting W. QUINE & J. ULLIAM, 
THE WEB OF BELIEF, 66–68 (“The truth may indeed be radically remote from our 
present system of beliefs, so that we may need a long series of conservative steps 
to attain what might have been attained in one rash leap. The longer the leap, 
however, the more serious an angular error in the direction.”)); Cole, supra note 
67, at 859 (discussing the tension between adhering to tradition, as exemplified in 
precedent, and breaking “radically” from it “by acts of ‘misreading,’” attributing 
to Harold Bloom the idea that “creativity is necessarily revisionist” and that those 
whom we consider ‘great,’ ‘strong,’ or ‘influential’ are those whose views stand 
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Professor Robert Blomquist echoes that thought in his 
recommendation that “good legal interpreters . . . should live 
prudently by embracing limits to interpretation.”81 The same might 
be said of scholars who take it upon themselves to interpret the work 
of prior scholars. Immoderate interpretations of prior scholarship 
transformed into litigation or legislative initiatives might lead to 
rejection not only of the overextended text, but also of the original, 
more moderate concept, once its expansive capabilities are 
understood.82 Professor Eco’s fear animates this Article and lends a 
sense of urgency to finding a way to cabin immoderate 
interpretations.83 
  
 
out as the most revisionary).  
 81  Blomquist, supra note 79, at 1118; see also Daniel A. Farber, The Case 
Against Brilliance, Commentary, 70 MINN. L. REV. 917, 917 (1986) (arguing that 
“the current academic bias in favor of brilliant, ‘paradigm shifting’ work should 
be abandoned in favor of the more pedestrian activity of ‘normal sciences.’”). 
 82  See Blomquist, supra note 79, at 1092 (quoting Stanley Fish as saying the 
“‘interpretative community’—the immediate and foreseeable legal audiences who 
are likely to judge the interpretation—may disagree with an outlier interpretational 
performance and consider it over the top”); id. at 1091 (“[T]hese actors [referring 
to clients, lawyers, inside counsel, law clerks, and judges, among others] must 
advance and defend an interpretational situation of the law in the course of 
performances to achieve litigation victories, transactional successes, preferred 
legal outcomes, legislative wins, and regulatory objectives.”). For examples of 
where the Supreme Court has limited a principle because of a perception it might 
have been overextended, see Industrial Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum 
Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (plurality decision adopting a limited interpretation of 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act to avoid having to find that benzene, a 
known carcinogen, presented a significant risk); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 
452 (1991) (finding it was unclear whether the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act covered appointed state judges and dismissing a suit challenging the Missouri 
Constitution for violating the federal statute and the Fourteenth Amendment); 
Nat’l Fed’n of  Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (limiting 
Congress’s spending power by striking down the threat of draconian cuts to state 
Medicaid grants unless states significantly expanded the program). 
 83  See Sax, supra note 3, at 552–53 (explaining that lawyers invite bad 
decisions by courts “when they assert extreme and doctrinaire positions such as 
any project which involves a lease to private interests is thereby illegal. One must 
provide a court with room to maneuver”). But see Cole, supra note 67, at 866 
(noting although “legitimacy rests on following precedent . . . greatness lies in 
breaking from precedent”). 
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Yet there are pressures on law faculty not only to produce 
scholarship,84 but also to write immoderately.85 Daniel Farber 
complains that the standards used in evaluating the worth of 
scholarship perversely honor “the ‘brilliantly novel and 
counterintuitive rather than the sensible.”86 Many law schools 
support scholarship with incentives like merit-based salary 
increases, summer research grants, sabbatical leaves, travel 
stipends, and student research assistants.87 Ego and the 
“expectations of university image-makers” not only encourage law 
professors to write, but also to write expansively.88 To many law 
professors “image is easily as important as substance” and to have 
an Ivy League law review publish, or even cite an article, is “a 
feather in one’s professional cap.”89 The personal motivation to 
 
 84  While some in the academy bemoan the number of articles that law 
professors write, others think there should be more articles produced, especially 
by “free-riding” tenured members of the faculty. Compare Lasson, supra note 78 
(1990), with David L. Gregory, The Assault on Scholarship, 32 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 993 (1991), and Andrew Phang, Scholarship in Perspective, 2 LEGAL EDUC. 
REV. 277 (1991). 
 85  Daniel A. Farber, Gresham’s Law of Legal Scholarship, 3 CONST. 
COMMENT. 307, 310 (1986) (“Scholarship is expected to be original, and defense 
of the conventional wisdom provides few opportunities for brilliance.”). 
Blomquist writes that, when it comes to interpretation of legal text, some scholars, 
like Adam Gearey, believe that there are “no limits other than the injunctive gestalt 
to ‘make it new.’” Blomquist, supra note 79, at 1114 (citing ADAM GEAREY, LAW 
AND AESTHETICS 75 (2001)). 
 86  Daniel A. Farber, Brilliance Revisited, 72 MINN. L. REV. 367, 367 (1987). 
But see Cole, supra note 67, at 863 (citing HAROLD BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF 
INFLUENCE (1973) 29, in which Bloom explains that “for a novice or ‘ephebe’ to 
emerge a strong creator, he must constructively misread his most important 
precursors”). 
 87  See Gregory, supra note 84, at 1002 (mentioning several of these 
incentives); Dan Subotnik, Scholarly Incentives, Scholarship, Article Selection 
Bias, and Investment Strategies for Today’s Law Schools, 30 TOURO L. REV. 615, 
617 (2014) (listing among faculty incentives diminished class loads, sabbaticals, 
leaves, research assistantships, and travel allowances); id. at 618 (noting that 
Touro used to provide a one-time bonus to faculty who successfully published 
their articles, which increased depending on the law review’s ranking). Subotnik 
credits U.S. News & World Report’s ranking system for law schools, which 
includes “prestige” as a metric, which in turn translates to scholarship’s 
publication in “high ranking journals.” Id. at 620. 
 88  Lasson, supra note 78, at 927 (saying in addition that “these traits are fueled 
by faculty-self-studies, administrative mission statements, and fiats laid down by 
the Association of American Law Schools”). 
 89  Id. at 948–49. Although Lasson attributes the preoccupation of law scholars 
with irrelevant and obscure matters to narcissism, the same drive to impress one’s 
colleagues can apply to showing cleverness at taking a well-researched and 
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write big combines with pressure in the academy for law professors 
to write something original on a new topic90 to distinguish 
themselves from other scholars—“the innocent ersatz” producing 
potentially mediocre articles for publication in less prestigious law 
journals.91 As this is hard to do in the area of public trust scholarship 
when the original idea has already been written, the solution is to 
push the doctrinal concept to hitherto unimagined heights. 
There are also legal scholars who write specifically to 
encourage law reform, where the law professor’s two callings—that 
of a scholar and a lawyer—are blended into a form of advocacy 
scholarship.92 Legal scholars who advocate for law reform may push 
an idea in their writings to influence litigation, and thus achieve a 
policy goal that might otherwise not be met.93 Even Professor Sax’s 
1970 Michigan article has been cited in forty-six judicial opinions 
since its publication.94 It is this nexus between advocacy scholarship 
and litigation where the risks from writing immoderately are most 
manifest and, therefore, of greatest concern.95 
 
analyzed topic a step beyond where previous scholars have taken it. Id.   
 90  Id. at 934 n.43 (quoting Farber, supra note 85 (“suggesting that the 
principle of ‘adverse selection’ operates in legal scholarship to ensure ‘law review 
literature will be dominated by articles taking silly positions”)). 
 91  Id. at 927. Professor Lasson attributes this to what he calls the “academic 
imperative” by their school’s promotion and tenure committees, which have 
“whipped [them] into a hack’s frenzy,” forced them “to jump through hoops,” and 
“to shimmy down the chutes of the publication process.” Id.; see also Farber, supra 
note 81, at 930 (“There is a tendency today for high-flying theorists to scoff at 
those whose work stays closer to the ground. Icarus, too, was undoubtedly scornful 
of pedestrianism.”). Farber in his article justifies why “‘brilliance’ should count 
heavily against an economic or legal theory.” Id. at 917. 
 92  There is a risk that a professor who engages in advocacy scholarship is no 
longer a “dispassionate scholar who observes and explores without a stake in the 
particular outcome,” and thus in some way devalues the scholarship. Marcus, 
supra note 5, at 694. An example of advocacy scholarship can be found in a 2006 
foreword to a symposium on an experience law student editors of the Harvard Civil 
Rights-Civil Liberties Law review had editing a piece by an inmate, in which he 
describes his experiences with habeas corpus review, in which the author of the 
forward warns editors of law journals who have the capacity to tell stories “to 
create the space in which others can tell theirs as well.” See Jocelyn Simonson, 
Foreword, Breaking the Silence: Legal Scholarship as Social Change, 41 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 298 (2006). 
 93  An example of this is the Children’s Trust litigation provoked by the 
scholarship of Professor Wood. See discussion supra note 17 and accompanying 
text. 
 94  See supra note 12. 
 95  Another factor motivating particularly scholars interested in law reform is 
the strongly held belief that the current status quo should be changed, again most 
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A “breakthrough article” like Professor Sax’s provides a 
foundation for subsequent scholars, already motivated to write 
expansively in furtherance of their own careers or to encourage law 
reform, to extend the scope of the article beyond its original 
framework. But each extension of the core doctrine creates a risk 
that the original idea, which was tenuous if for no other reason than 
it was new, might become too far removed from common 
understandings or so unconnected to shared experiences that it 
becomes unsustainable in the real world.96 Thus, scholars proposing 
ever-expanding public trust doctrine interpretations, unmoored from 
Professor Sax’s original vision, encourage litigants to press these 
theories in court. But these novel theories may push courts beyond 
their comfort level—the doctrine’s distance from its origins may 
disrupt settled expectations regarding commonly understood 
property law concepts— and judges may reject or constrain the 
doctrine.97 
 
clearly manifested in the recent writings and actions of Professor Wood. See, e.g., 
Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government, supra note 69 (arguing for 
a planetary trust). According to Professor Farber “[b]ecause we evaluate abstract 
theories largely by examining their concrete implications, there is little reason to 
abandon strongly held concrete beliefs simply because they conflict with theory.” 
Farber, supra note 86, at 373. 
 96  See Marcus, supra note 5, at 695 (questioning whether “it is desirable to 
promote such breakthroughs since law is a human endeavor and insights that never 
occurred to anybody before may be too remote from experience”). Marcus goes 
on to say that “no one should expect this sort of scholarship as steady work” as 
“[s]ea changes in law are relative rare, and few are positioned to seize the time and 
attach their names to such changes.” Id.; see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. 
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (announcing the circumstances in which a prior 
understanding may be abandoned, saying that it is “common wisdom that the rule 
of stare decisis is not an “inexorable command, and certainly it is not such in every 
constitutional case,” and saying when a prior holding is reexamined the Court’s 
opinion is “informed by a series of prudential and practical considerations,” such 
as “whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical 
workability, . . .; whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a 
special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of 
repudiation, . . .; whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have 
left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine,. . .; or whether 
facts have so changed or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old 
rule of significant application or justification”). 
 97  The exchange between Justices Brennan and Scalia over the application of 
the public trust doctrine in Nollan, which led to Justice Brennan withdrawing his 
discussion of the application of the public trust doctrine to the facts of that case in 
his dissent, after Scalia included a rejoinder in a draft opinion, illustrates the reality 
of this risk. See Byrne, supra note 29, at 921–22; see also Ralph G. Steinhardt, 
Determining Which Human Rights Claims “Touch and Concern” the United 
States: Justice Kennedy’s Filartiga, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1695, 1703 (2014) 
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A second risk is that the proliferation of spinoff articles 
constructing ever more fantastic new applications for Professor 
Sax’s work, by sheer volume and eccentricity, might leave the 
original idea “lost in the constant flux of novel theories.”98 
Unfortunately, Professor Farber’s hope in this situation that “only 
truly valid insights would survive” might be defeated by Gresham’s 
Law, which essentially says that “bad money drives out good.” 
Applying Gresham’s Law means that Professor Sax’s explication of 
the public trust doctrine will be driven out while only “bad coins 
[the extreme uses of his concept] will circulate.”99 
With respect to the litigation risk that might be triggered by 
intemperate, heedless scholarship, this Part has suggested that since 
the public trust doctrine is a common law precept, its use as a vehicle 
for protecting natural resources, as envisioned by Professor Sax, 
depends on the support of both the judicial and legislative branches 
of government. If this support is lost, so will be the capacity of the 
doctrine to goad legislators and administrators to fill gaps in 
environmentally protective laws. Going too far with a common law 
 
(discussing how the Court closed the door to overly creative applications of the 
Alien Tort Statute of 1789 (ATS), “with the result that excessively restrictive 
interpretations of the statute and excessively expansive ones are equally 
disapproved”); id. at 1698 (saying the Court deployed “a rhetoric of caution” in 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013), directed at plaintiffs 
who had sought relief under the statute when it involved not only an alien plaintiff, 
but an alien defendant and alien conduct). The ATS relies on the common law to 
create a cause of action under the ATS, id. at 1697, which strengthens the analogy 
to the common law public trust doctrine and makes the cautionary message 
relevant. 
 98  Farber, supra note 86, at 377. Authors on the cusp of writing similar 
breakthrough articles might also be discouraged from doing so by the fear that 
their ideas might be overextended by subsequent scholars and jeopardize what they 
had hoped to achieve. For example, subsequent scholars misconceived Professor 
Chayes’ Public Law Litigation as a description of “a new breed of litigation that 
resulted from judicial activism” after Brown v. Board of Education II, 349 U.S. 
294 (1955). Marcus, supra note 5, at 668–69 (arguing that Chayes was “more 
circumspect on this point”). Professor Chayes felt a need to correct the false 
impression the derivative scholarship created, even as it was lauded. Id.  
 99  Farber, supra note 85, at 307. Gresham’s Law is an observation in the field 
of economics that when coins composed of metals of different values have the 
same value as legal tender, than those made of cheaper metal will be used for 
payment, while the ones containing more expensive metal will be hoarded and 
eventually disappear from circulation. JOHN BLACK ET AL., A DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS 179 (4th ed. 2013). Farber also refers to Darwin’s theory of natural 
selection and says that, contrary to that theory, selection in economics can weed 
out the fittest members of a particular group, leaving only the less fit ones, which 
in some circumstances can “lead to the total collapse of a market.” 
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doctrine invites a court to turn away from the doctrine or a 
legislature to limit it.100 Enough acts by courts and legislatures 
negating the doctrine’s use could cast a pall over its viability other 
than as an interesting artifact of ancient law101 and lead to its 
ultimate demise. 
IV. IS THERE AN INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL CHECK TO REQUIRE 
SCHOLARS TO THINK BEFORE THEY LEAP? 
Moral order is, therefore, an interactional phenomenon. Violations of 
expectations become violations of obligations and are thus subject to social 
sanctions.102 
Accepting for argument’s sake the severity of the risk to the 
continued viability of the public trust doctrine, this Part of the 
Article examines whether academic norms might temper the zeal of 
legal scholars to overextend a prior scholar’s original contribution 
to the scholarly literature.103 The Part discusses norms and some 
 
 100  See, e.g., Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1983) (abolishing 
federal general common law as judicial overreach, and saying “There is no federal 
general common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of 
common law applicable to a state whether they be local in their nature or general, 
be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the 
Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts”); see also 
Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991) (establishing that there is a 
constitutional limit for punitive damages that a court may award); accord TXO 
Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 538 U.S. 408 (2003); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. 
Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 
4008 (2003). Courts may also address overreach concerns about a doctrine less 
direct than undermining the doctrine itself, instead claiming that a statute prevents 
the use of the doctrine. See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 
2527, 2537 (2011) (declining to decide whether plaintiffs could use a federal 
common law nuisance claim to seek the curtailment of greenhouse gas emissions 
because any such claim would be displaced by the Clean Air Act). As an example 
of legislative limits placed on common law doctrines when there is a concern that 
the doctrine may have been over-used, some state legislatures, in the context of 
broader tort reform, have limited joint and several liability to specific factual 
situations. See James J. Scheske, The Reform of Joint and Several Liability Theory: 
A Survey of State Approaches, 54 J. Air L. & Com. 627, 635–36, 642–50 (1988). 
 101  But see Cole, supra note 67, at 905 (“Our traditions are born from breaks 
with past tradition, and are given new life from the continuing redefinitions that 
strong misreadings confer.”). 
 102  David R. Karp, The New Debate About Shame in Criminal Justice: An 
Interactionist Account, 21 JUST. SYS. J. 301, 314 (2000).  
 103  For a discussion of the difference between individual and social norms, see 
Hope M. Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility for Improving the 
Environment: Moving Toward a New Environmental Norm, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 117, 135–136 (2009).  
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problems with their use before moving onto an examination of the 
efficacy and robustness of two existing norms, the norm of academic 
integrity and the norm against over-interpretation.104 This Part also 
explores the possibility of creating a new specific norm to 
discourage overextending the work of a prior scholar into the real 
world danger zone. 
A. Norms in General 
Norms are social rules promulgated and enforced by the 
community to which they apply.105 They provide “social meaning” 
for individuals in communities and thus the framework in which 
people live.106 Social norms function as “nonlegal rules or 
obligations that certain individuals feel compelled to follow despite 
the lack of formal legal sanctions, whether because defiance would 
subject them to sanction from others (typically in the form of 
disapproval, lowered esteem, or even ostracism) or because they 
would feel guilty for failing to conform to the norm (a so-called 
internalized norm).”107 Concern about esteem is especially 
 
 104  Academic freedom is an obvious norm, but functions more as one that 
enables academic scholarly zeal than one that would restrain it as are norms that 
govern faculty in non-law disciplines, like medicine or the humanities. See Emily 
M. Calhoun, Academic Freedom: Disciplinary Lessons from Hogwarts, 77 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 843 (2006) (discussing the relevance of the reality of discipline to 
debates on academic freedom and saying “faculty in our universities also live their 
professional lives within disciplinary constraints and norms”).  
 105  See Richard A. Posner & Eric B. Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing 
Norms, with Special Reference to Sanctions, 19 INT’L. L. & ECON. 369, 369 (1999) 
(“A norm is a social rule that does not depend on government for either 
promulgation or enforcement.”); see also Robert D. Cooter, Three Effects of Social 
Norms on Law: Expression, Deterrence, and Internalization, 79 OR. L. REV. 1, 5 
(2000) (defining a social norm as “an obligation backed by a social sanction”; an 
obligation, as “a statement about what people ought to do, such as pay taxes and 
clean up after their dogs”; a social sanction as a “punishment imposed, not by state 
officials, but by ordinary people, such as shunning a litigious lawyer or refusing 
to deal with a flaw firm that organizes hostile takeovers”); Vandenbergh & Raimi, 
supra note 70, at 146 (“Social norms can lead to social ordering in the absence of 
law, and can complement, undermine, displace, or encourage legal formation and 
enforcement.”). 
 106  Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Social Meaning of Environmental Command 
and Control, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 191, 200 (2001). 
 107  Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 Cal. L. Rev. 1231, 1231–32, 1238 
(2001); see also id. at 1239 (“In rational actor terms, violating a social norm 
imposes a cost on the violator that can tip the cost-benefit balance in favor of 
conformity with the norm.”); Alex Geisinger, A Group Identity Theory of Social 
Norms and Its Implications, 78 TUL. L. REV. 605, 608 (2004) (“The sanctions can 
be based on shame or some other type of social ostracism.”); Vandenbergh, supra 
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important in close-knit groups, like academic institutions, because 
most people care what their peers think about them. Concomitantly, 
compliance with a norm improves when there are “opportunities to 
communicate esteem (or lack of it) within the group.”108 Often 
people engage in behavior that may not be important to them in their 
individual capacity to show allegiance to a group “with which they 
have their most valuable interactions” or in some cases to establish 
a network with them.109 Thus, even legal scholars who would prefer 
to immoderately expand the ideas of a prior scholar might restrain 
themselves in order to show they are part of the dominant group 
established around a norm of scholarly restraint, should one arise.110 
This is not to say that external rules or policies play no role in 
directing behavior; indeed they can still serve an expressive 
function, even when unenforced, and can “reconstruct norms and 
the social meaning of action,”111 as discussed later in this Part. 
Close-knit communities where there are sufficient “iterative 
relations or information exchange to enable social norm sanctioning 
to occur” are conducive to norms functioning as behavioral 
controls.112 Law schools are examples of such communities where 
 
note 106, at 200 (A social norm is “an informal obligation that may be internalized 
(and enforced through guilt) or that may arise without internalization (and be 
enforced through external non-legal sanctions such as stigma or ostracism).”). 
 108  Carlson, supra note 107, at 1290; see also Calhoun, supra note 104, at 853 
(“[A] faculty member’s work is deemed worthy, not because some miscellaneous 
external consumer of information might choose to buy it . . . but because the 
affiliates of a discipline as a whole choose to accept it.”). 
 109  Richard A. Posner, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and Economic Analysis 
of Law: A Comment, 27 J. LEGAL Stud. 553, 554 (1998) (explaining that “signaling 
theory” is “a version of rational choice theory, . . . in which people engage in 
behavior that they may not value, such as saluting the flag or denouncing Bosnians, 
in order to signal their loyalty to the group with which they have their most 
valuable interactions or, more broadly, in order to establish a network . . . .”). 
 110  Professor Margo Schlanger comments that how a person defines what it is 
she must do may be more responsive to their external reference group than to the 
preferences of her supervisors. See Margo Schlanger, Offices of Goodness: 
Influence without Authority in Federal Agencies, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 53, 114 
(2014) (quoting JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT 
AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 60 (1989) and saying “the way a person 
defines his or her task may reflect more the standards of the external reference 
group than the preferences of internal management”). 
 111  Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
2021, 2034–35, 2032 (1996). 
 112  Michael P. Vandenbergh, Order Without Social Norms: How Personal 
Norm Activation Can Protect the Environment, 99 NW. U.L. REV. 1101, 1105 
(2005) (Social sanctions for breaching a norm will not occur in “situations in 
which the individual’s actions are not observable by others and situations in which 
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interaction can and often does generate habits, which can turn into 
reciprocal obligations that other members of the group can 
sanction.113 This transformation happens when individuals identify 
themselves as belonging to a particular group, which, in turn, can 
lead the individual to identify and assimilate the group prototype (or 
norm), where “individual behavior is replaced by group-guided 
behavior.”114 Professors in this instance might change their behavior 
by refraining from writing articles that overextend a prior scholar’s 
work, or, more modestly, evaluating the consequences of 
expansionist writings before publication—a “stop, look, and listen” 
cautionary moment for academic scholars.115 
 
the actions are observable but occur in non-close knit groups as loose-knit group 
situations”); see also Karp, supra note 102, at 313 (“Repeated interactions give 
rise to habits. They are perceived by the actors and become expectations in the 
sense of predictions or anticipations of behavior . . . . [E]ach actor feels 
constrained to live up to the expectations, partly out of a feeling that the other will 
be irritated, offended, or disappointed if the expectation is not fulfilled.”). 
 113  Karp, supra note 102, at 313 (“[I]nteraction generates habits; perceived, 
they become reciprocal expectations; in addition to their purely predictive and 
anticipatory nature, sensitivity to them endows them with a constraining or even 
an obligatory character . . . . Thus do norms grow in unplanned fashion out of 
ongoing interaction.”); id. at 314 (“[I]dentity is constructed interactionally as 
others attempt to ascertain the identity of a person, and that person’s own identity 
is developed in response to others’ expectations.”); see also Michael P. 
Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of Social Norms in 
Corporate Environmental Compliance, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 68–69 (2003) 
(noting educational institutions can be sources of internal norms that can 
“inculcate” members of the group through contacts – membership in the group 
creates the environment within which internal norms can be enforced through 
“feelings of guilt, anxiety, loss of self-esteem and other related emotions”). 
 114  Geisinger, supra note 107, at 632. Although writing about government 
employees, Professor Margo Schlanger’s comments about the importance of 
professional identifications and groupings appear equally relevant to law 
professors. See Schlanger, supra note 110, at 113 (“Numerous scholars have 
written about professional identification in government agencies, and how 
professional commitments and professional reference groups, and the cultural 
distinctions they produce, can be outcome-determinative.”). 
 115  Some professional codes guiding scientific research have adopted as an 
informal rule, a norm of foreseeability “in so far as humanly possible.” See 
Nicholas H. Steneck, Fostering Professionalism and Integrity in Research, 5 U. 
ST. THOMAS L.J. 522, 534 (2008) (citing a provision in the Society for Social 
Responsibility in Science’s code requiring individual researchers “to foresee, 
insofar as possible, the results of his professional work”). Cf. Baltimore & Ohio 
R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927) (announcing Justice Holmes’ rule for what 
people should do when they approach a railroad track, finding plaintiff responsible 
for his own death by not checking to see if a train was approaching). Asking that 
legal scholars stop and think about the broader consequences of their writings is 
similar to environmental laws like section 102(2)(C) of the National 
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B. Existing Norms of Possible Relevance 
A scholar’s discipline contains its “own norms for determining 
what counts or is valuable and when one can trust in the truth of a 
particular matter.”116 It also “determines what ‘counts’ as an 
important question or topic to pursue in research or teaching.”117 A 
“discipline takes its identity from an internal disciplinary consensus 
on ethical norms and professional behavior.”118 Members of a 
discipline who conform their behavior to “their role obligations,” or 
norms, are considered to be living “appropriately within the 
discipline”; those who do not “are in trouble,” no matter how 
“brilliantly and effectively [they have] made use of a complicated 
body of theoretical knowledge.”119 Thus, norms adopted by the 
discipline of law might constrain how expansively a legal scholar 
treats another’s ideas.120 Two such norms are discussed below.121 
1. The Norm of Academic Integrity122 
This discussion assumes that there is linkage between the idea 
 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c)(ii) (2012), and section 7 
of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2012), which both 
require agencies to think about their actions before they engage in them. 
 116  Calhoun, supra note 104, at 848. 
 117  Id. 
 118  Id. at 849. 
 119  Id. Professor Calhoun continues by saying that “these role obligations are 
the reason for the standard assertion that privileges, such as academic freedom, 
entail responsibilities.” Id. 
 120  See id. at 863–71 (proposing that a discipline’s norms be used in evaluating 
academic freedom arguments); see also id. at 854 (complaining that debates about 
academic freedom “convey no sense of the possibility that when academic 
freedom is threatened, it is because the integrity of a discipline, not only individual 
liberty, is at risk.”); J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A “Special Concern of the 
First Amendment,” 99 YALE L. J. 251, 258 (1989) (explaining that the unique 
value of academic speech is due to “the disciplinary and ethical constraints under 
which it is produced”). 
 121  In a review of the literature on potential academic norms, these are the only 
two that surfaced of potential applicability. 
 122  Integrity is of major concern in the field of scientific research. See Steneck, 
supra note 115, at 522 (“While the ambiguity surrounding the proposed new norm 
of restraint makes it difficult to determine when a violation of that norm has 
occurred, a clear institutional standard or rule eliminates that ambiguity.”). 
Although science provides the most opportunities for research, the experiences 
with various scientific disciplines in trying to assure the integrity of research done 
in their fields and the problems encountered are not so unique to make studying 
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of fealty to a prior author’s original concept and the norm of 
academic integrity.123 Accepting for the moment the correctness of 
that linkage, Professor Harold Lewis identifies three issues of 
academic integrity, which are helpful in understanding how the 
norm might function in the context of overextending a prior author’s 
original concept. They are: (1) whether to write at all, given 
conflicting pressures on law professors to write, teach, and provide 
service to their school; (2) topic selection, which can involve some 
career risk for untenured faculty and a risk to post-tenure 
compensation and writing grants for tenured professors; and (3) 
integrity issues raised by the methods and means of scholarship.124  
If, as Professor Peter Byrne suggests, “[t]he disinterested search for 
knowledge fosters a manner of discourse that, at its best, is careful, 
critical and ambitious,”125 then the question whether scholarly 
ambition is limitless is encountered, if at all, at the third tier of 
academic integrity on Professor Lewis’ list—“methods and means 
of scholarship.” Plagiarism, falsifying data, and “stooping to uncivil 
discourse” are typical examples of third-tier academic integrity 
issues,”126 but none of them touches on what is at issue here—
overextending a prior scholar’s idea. 
While overextending Professor Sax’s concept of public trust 
may approach Professor Lewis’ third-tier integrity issue of 
“consciously distorting legal materials to conform to predetermined 
 
how the discipline of science has approached the norm of research integrity. See 
id. at 523 (noting that science “is, by most measures, the dominant component of 
research,” especially when the social sciences are included); id. at 524 (saying “the 
fundamental principles underlying scientific research and shaping its ethic are 
applicable to all research, whatever the field”). 
 123  What is not at issue here is plagiarism or copyright infringement. With 
respect to the latter, an author of an original idea cannot protect “elements that 
naturally flow from the subject more than from the author’s creativity” under the 
scenès à faire doctrine. That doctrine “prevents protecting elements of a work 
derived from expressions or representations that necessarily flow from one 
common idea.” Carlos Castellanos Rubio, Columbia’s Poetic World of Authors’ 
Moral Rights: Considerations of Imprisoning a Professor for Plagiarism, 22 PAC. 
RIM L. & POL’Y J. 141, 154 (2013). 
 124  See generally Lewis, supra note 2. Professor Farber makes the additional 
point that for the “untenured beginner,” who has “to work hard to attract attention,” 
the decision to push the scholarship envelope and take “a shocking position is a 
manifestly reasonable strategy.” Farber, supra note 85, at 310. 
 125  See Byrne, supra note 120, at 334. 
 126  Lewis, supra note 2, at 611. Steneck notes that these problems and others 
are rampant in scientific research. See Steneck, supra note 115, at 528 (“The gap 
between ideals and reality exists in all aspects of research.”). 
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views,”127 for the most part, it is not a good fit for any of the third-
tier offenses. A “distortion” could be driven by personal ambition 
or by the desire to promote law reform in another venue, but 
generally, legal materials are not being misrepresented, falsified, or 
altered; they are merely being stretched to fit a new set of facts.128 
Even if a fit could be found, it is harder than in cases of obvious 
threats to academic integrity like plagiarism or data falsification to 
see exactly where a line has been crossed—when does extension 
become overextension?129 Thus, the norm of academic integrity 
seems not particularly helpful in limiting risky scholarship, and is 
not analyzed further. 
2. The Norm of Refraining from Rhetorical Excess 
Some scholars have expressed concern about the penchant for 
interpretative excesses in judicial opinions and law journal 
articles.130 According to Professor Blomquist, the concept of 
rhetorical competence, the obverse of rhetorical excess, “involves, 
at its core, a moral pursuit of the ‘art of understanding,’ dedicated 
to advancing a robust ‘scholarly enterprise’ entailing the 
interpreter’s good faith interpretation that clearly discloses to the 
audience ‘any truth claim regarding the authorial intentions of a 
given text.’”131 On the positive side, rhetorical excesses can be used 
 
 127  Lewis, supra note 2, at 611. 
 128  The Office of Research Integrity (ORI), a statutory office created by 
Congress in 1993, defines “falsification,” in its Public Health Service Policies on 
Research Misconduct Rule, 40 C.F.R. § 93.103 (2005), as “manipulating research 
materials, equipment of processes, or changing or omitting data or results such that 
the research is not accurately represented in the research record.” See Chris B. 
Pascal, The Office of Research Integrity: Experience and Authorities, 35 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 795, 796 (2006). 
 129  See DWORKIN, supra note 69, at 410 (explaining that “integrity does not 
enforce itself: judgment is required,” and “that judgment is structured by different 
dimensions of interpretation and different aspects of these”). Dworkin goes on to 
say that this is what makes legal judgments “pervasively contestable.” Id. at 411. 
 130  See generally Blomquist, supra note 79. Blomquist identifies the tendency 
to “overinterpret law” within “America’s fascination with excess.” Id. at 1084. 
 131  Id. at 1086; see also Subotnik, supra note 87, at 616 n.4 (quoting ANTHONY 
T. KRONMAN, EDUCATION’S END: WHY OUR COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES HAVE 
GIVEN UP ON THE MEANING OF LIFE 111 (2007) (“[T]he equation of scholarly 
specialization with duty and honor . . . makes the development of one’s place in 
the division of intellectual labor a spiritually meaningful goal, and not just an 
economic organizational imperative.”), quoted in RICHARD ARUM & JOSIPA 
ROSKA, ACADEMICALLY ADRIFT 10 (2011)). According to Subotnik, Arum adds 
that academic writing is a “moral imperative.” Id.  
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to test common interpretations, find new meanings in tired text, and 
lead to new understandings. 
Although Blomquist is referring to lawyers, judges, and 
legislators when he writes that they all must “advance and defend 
an interpretational situation of the law,” legal scholars are no 
different when they advance interpretations of prior scholarly 
work.132 Interpretational excesses create a risk that an interpretation 
that is considered excessive will be rejected.133 This risk suggests 
that there may be a need to cabin interpretations of legal doctrine by 
adhering to a norm of avoiding rhetorical excesses.134 While this 
norm is more applicable to the problem of overextension of prior 
scholarship than is the norm of academic integrity, relying only on 
the creation of the norm would still leave, among other problems, a 
significant hurdle because of conflicting norms and widespread 
noncompliance with such a norm by public trust scholars, as 
discussed in more detail below. 
A social norm only begins to control behavior when “a 
significant proportion of people in a community internalize [it].”135 
However, within any one individual there may be conflicting norms 
competing for control of that individual’s behavior.136 Any one of 
these competing social norms might command greater community 
or social approval.137 Thus, if what Professor Vandenbergh calls the 
“autonomy norm,”138 encompassing academic freedom, is held in 
high esteem, the likelihood that scholars will internalize a contrary 
 
 132  Blomquist, supra note 79, at 1091–92 (explaining that lawyers function like 
actors and “must strategically decide upon an interpretational approach for each 
material issue” in a conflict, noting in addition that “common sense and pragmatic 
interpretational approaches are likely to have the highest probability of success”). 
 133  Id. at 1092; see also notes 71–73, 96–97 and accompanying text.  
 134  Blomquist, supra note 79, at 1085–86 (citing Umberto Eco for support of 
this proposition). 
 135  Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The 
Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
1643, 1665 (1996). 
 136  See Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics 
and Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887, 897 (1998) (“New norms never enter a 
normative vacuum but instead emerge in a highly contested normative space where 
they must compete with other norms and perceptions of interest.”). 
 137  Id. at 892 (noting also that “[e]ven within a community norms are 
continuous, rather than dichotomous, entities”). 
 138  Vandenbergh, supra note 113 at 99 (“The norm of autonomy . . . can be 
expressed simply as follows: ‘An individual should be left alone unless events 
suggest that the individual has done or will do something morally 
blameworthy.’”). 
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norm, like scholarly restraint, is diminished.139 Indeed, one might 
actually expect legal scholars to increase their non-conforming 
behavior in reaction to pressure that restricts their academic 
freedom.140 
Additionally, since scholars are praised for bold ideas and there 
are few incentives for moderation or incrementalism in their 
writings, few will be observed adhering to a more moderate use of 
earlier ideas.141 If the prevailing norm is to be immoderate, then, in 
all likelihood, new scholars will adhere to that norm.142 In fact, 
rhetorical excesses enable scholars to distinguish themselves, and to 
earn rewards.143 
Enforcing norms in the legal academy can also be difficult. 
Professor Alex Geisinger says “norm ‘enforcement’ results from an 
individual’s identification with a group.”144 Group identification 
“results in the process of depersonalization, where the individual 
self becomes less cognitively prominent than the group self,” 
resulting in actions and behaviors conforming to the group norm.145 
While law professors are part of an institutional group, a law faculty, 
the dynamic of depersonalization hardly fits what happens to them 
in the legal academy, where individual excellence is rewarded.146 
Therefore, it is unlikely that a law faculty would function as a group 
to enforce against deviation from a group norm by any individual 
member of the faculty. 
 
 139  See Babcock, supra note 103, at 152 (discussing conflicting norms within 
any one individual); see also Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 136, at 897. 
 140  Vandenbergh, supra note 113, at 101; see also Steneck, supra note 115, at 
539 (“Researchers have, however, a strain of independence and blind faith in truth 
that sometimes stands in the way of taking steps to foster professional 
development.”). 
 141  See supra notes 84–95 and accompanying text (discussing academic 
incentives encouraging law professors to write immoderately). 
 142  Vandebergh calls this the “conformity norm,” which he explains as 
requiring that “‘[a]n individual should act as others do.’” Vandenbergh, supra note 
113, at 112.  
 143  See supra notes 84–95 and accompanying text (discussing pressure on 
academic scholars to be provocative and excessive). 
 144  Geisinger, supra note 107, at 638. 
 145  Id. 
 146  See Jay Newman, Academic Freedom and the Power of the Guild, 30 
IMPROVING COLLEGE AND UNIV. TEACHING 8, 10 (1982) (“[M]embers of an 
academic department or professional association are involved in a competitive 
situation: they are competing for prestige in the department, university and 
academic field; and they are also competing for promotion, opportunities, research 
grants, etc.”). 
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The fact that guilt is the primary “internal enforcement 
mechanism” inhibiting norm violations147 is also a challenging 
circumstance here. The meaning of a norm is “contextual,” 
reflecting the environment in which it emerges, and it accretes 
interpretative content from arising in that environment.148 Here, the 
interpretative content of a norm urging moderation in scholarship is 
sufficiently ambiguous to create confusion about precisely what 
specific positive behavior is required and what constitutes 
acceptable moderation. This ambiguity lessens the guilt an offender 
might otherwise feel from her deviant behavior and presents fertile 
ground for developing rationales to excuse noncompliance.149  
Examples of “mechanisms that neutralize guilt” are “redefining the 
problem in a way that does not trigger the applicable norm,”150 such 
as suggesting that the questionable article was written to test the 
limits of an idea as a provocation for other scholarship, or that 
everyone is engaging in the unwelcome behavior. 
One way to increase positive conforming behavior and 
individual compliance with a norm is to provide positive feedback 
about how others are performing as well as feedback on each 
scholar’s own comparative performance.151 But, if the people who 
 
 147  Vandenbergh, supra note 112 at 83 (“Empirical studies suggest that guilt is 
the principle internal enforcement mechanism that sanctions violations of the norm 
of law compliance.”).  
 148  Deborah Waire Post, Academic Freedom as Private Ordering: Politics and 
Professionalism in the 21st Century, 53 LOY. L. REV. 177, 181 (2007) (referring to 
the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, endorsed by 
the AALS, and saying that, “[l]ike most norms or contract terms, their meaning is 
contextual”). 
 149  Vandenbergh, supra note 113 at 85 (suggesting “a number of ways in which 
guilt can be neutralized, including the lack of an identifiable victim, complexity of 
the law, the defense of necessity, condemnation of the system, denial of 
responsibility and appeal to higher loyalties. . . . [Of these], complexity and the 
lack of an identifiable victim are perhaps most important for environmental 
compliance”). 
 150  Id. at 77. Another version of this problem is that people may feel 
overwhelmed “by the challenge [presented by the scope and size of an 
environmental problem], and ultimately helpless to address it.”  Michael Specter, 
Big Foot: In Measuring Carbon Emissions, It’s Easy to Confuse Morality with 
Science, NEW YORKER, Feb. 25, 2008 at 53, http://www.newyorker.com/ 
magazine/2008/02/25/big-foot; see also John C. Dernbach, Harnessing Individual 
Behavior to Address Global Climate Change: Options for Congress, 26 VA. 
ENVTL. L.J. 107, 127 (2008) (“[A]ny effort to engage individuals must focus on 
(1) real choices that are available to individuals, and (2) increasing the number, 
attractiveness, and awareness of those choices.”). 
 151  See Carlson, supra note 107, at 1289–90 (“The feedback mechanisms, 
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conform are seen as odd or as a minority, observers are less likely 
to change their own behavior, until the compliant behavior becomes 
more widespread.152 Given how few public trust scholars are 
cabining their use of the doctrine in their writings,153 it is unlikely 
that they will be able to change anyone else’s behavior. The fact that 
writing expansively about the public trust doctrine is currently the 
firmly embedded behavior also means that there is almost no 
possibility that any scholar who tries to enforce a new norm of 
restraint—Sunstein’s norm entrepreneurs154—would be heeded. It is 
more likely that these self-appointed enforcers of a more cabined 
approach to the doctrine would be ostracized by their peers for 
engaging in what the majority believes to be inappropriate 
behavior.155 
People will not change their behavior in response to a norm if 
they do not believe the reason for the behavior change or if they 
question the legitimacy of the norm.156 All it takes is the resistance 
 
which demonstrate to individual households how they measure up to others, work 
best for those who are not carrying their weight. When households learn they are 
cooperating less than their neighbors, a norm of cooperation may trigger increased 
cooperative behavior. Alternatively, households may feel competitive with other 
households and want to best, or at least equal, their neighbors’ performance. Either 
way, feedback seems to work.”). 
 152  See Carlson, supra note 107, at 1239 (saying Robert Cooter “suggests that 
a large part of a community must internalize a norm for it to direct behavior”); cf. 
Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C. Steineman, The Carbon-Neutral Individual, 
82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1673, 1705 (2007) (“If people perceive carbon-reducing 
behavior changes as the exclusive province of eccentric, committed 
environmentalists, they will be less likely to engage in those behaviors themselves. 
If those carbon-reducing behaviors are perceived as widespread, however, more 
people are likely to adopt them.”). 
 153  See, e.g., supra notes 57–60 (identifying examples of imaginative uses of 
the public trust doctrine). 
 154  Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 
909 (1996) (defining “norm entrepreneurs” as “people interested in changing 
social norms.”  When successful, they produce “norm bandwagons,” which are 
created when small changes in behavior result in large ones, and “norm cascades,” 
which happen when there are “rapid shifts in norms”). 
 155  Finnemore and Sikkink acknowledge that norm entrepreneurs may need to 
employ “deliberately inappropriate acts,” which may result in “their ostracism,” 
even though those acts may be “powerful tools for norm entrepreneurs seeking to 
send a message and frame an issue.” Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 136, at 897. 
 156  See Christopher Deabler, The Normative and Legal Deficiencies of “Public 
Morality,” 19 J.L. & POL. 23, 34–35 (2003) (“Though we may be motivated to 
adopt certain normative frameworks, they have to be justified cognitively to 
ourselves if they are to legitimately govern behavior. This framework must consist 
of a justification of norms generally and the justification of their societal 
implementation. Though we might be motivated to accept ‘public morality,’ we 
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of just a few people for behavioral change not to occur.157 In the case 
of the public trust doctrine, there have been many well-established 
scholars, including the author, who have not adhered to any norm of 
moderation.158 For an individual to internalize a norm and change 
her behavior, the norm must be widely shared.159 If it is not widely 
shared, then others will lack esteem for any individual behavioral 
change.160 And esteem matters,161 especially in a close-knit 
community like academia where scholarship is widely read and 
commented on.162 Self-esteem is also important. If an individual can 
feel proud of her behavior, then it is more likely that she will engage 
 
must have a convincing argument for why we must have it to preserve 
society. . . .”); see also Manik Roy, Pollution Prevention, Organizational Culture, 
and Social Learning, 22 ENVTL. L. 189, 215 (1992) (“An elusive but central 
characteristic of organization culture is anomie, the confusion over norms or 
theories in action in the minds of individuals or organization members.”). 
 157  Roy, supra note 156 at 215 (commenting on how unorganized resistance 
by just a few people to change can prevent change from occurring). 
 158  See supra notes 13–16 (listing some examples of the author’s immoderate 
writings); supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.  
 159  See Cooter, supra note 105, at 22 (“Social norms influence the response of 
citizens to law through expression, deterrence and internalization.”); Carlson, 
supra note 107, at 1240. But see Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, 
and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 379 (1997) (cited by Carlson for 
believing that “internalization is not necessary because people react to and desire 
the esteem of others, whether or not they believe in the correctness of a norm.”).   
 160  See Carlson, supra note 107, at 1332 (“Recyclers get either intrinsic 
satisfaction for doing the right thing, approval from friends and neighbors for their 
environmentally correct behavior, or both.”); id. at 1299 (“The recycling evidence 
shows that norm internalization matters in predicting compliance with a norm for 
high-effort behavior: the stronger one believes in a norm the more effort she will 
exert.”). 
 161  See Vandenbergh & Raimi, supra note 70, at 149 (citing Sunstein, supra 
note 154, at 914–21) (“[R]eputational incentives are an important component of 
social sanctions and benefits.”). 
 162  Carlson, supra note 107, at 1290 (“Cooperative behavior typically 
increases when opportunities to communicate esteem (or lack of it) increase.”); id. 
at 1299–1300 (“[T]he most effective techniques for increasing norm compliance, 
face-to-face contact and behavior feedback, play on the human desire to be well-
regarded by others. These techniques seem to work on both levels by increasing 
the opportunities to signal or gather esteem, while simultaneously increasing 
attitudes in favor of the behavior.”); Paul C. Stern, Understanding Individuals’ 
Environmentally Significant Behavior, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,785, 10,788 (2005) 
(“[N]orm activation can be enhanced in a community context in which face-to-
face communication, mutual interdependence, and the possibility for social 
influence can build interpersonal norms that buttress personal norms.”); 
Vandenbergh & Raimi, supra note 70, at 154 (“[S]ocial norms enforced by 
contemporaries are a powerful motivator of behavior.”). 
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in norm-compliant behavior.163 But in both the case of external and 
internal esteem, there will be no outside affirmation of that 
behavior—there is little likelihood that the moderate article will 
receive academic recognition or reward or be praised by peers.164 
As in the case of the academic integrity norm, distinguishing 
between acceptable incremental change in interpretation and an 
undesirable rhetorical excess is hard to do. The result is that a norm 
of avoiding rhetorical excess would be difficult to enforce by 
provoking guilt or shame at violating a norm, either externally or 
internally, as a check on aberrant behavior. Like the norm of 
academic integrity, a norm of avoiding rhetorical excesses is 
difficult to apply and enforce, and it may, in fact, even be counter-
indicated to the extent its ambiguity stifles creativity. 
C. Creating a New Specific Norm to Discourage Overextension 
of Prior Scholarship 
If problems with the existing norms discussed above make 
them ineffective as a check on public trust scholars overextending 
Professor Sax’s original idea, then perhaps a new norm calling for 
scholarly restraint and attention to his concerns prior to publication 
might work, if circumstances exist to encourage its emergence. 
However, as the analysis below shows, circumstances are not 
favorable for such a norm to emerge on its own.165 But if it could 
emerge, it would then fit within the broader academic freedom 
norm, becoming part of the accepted behavior protected by that 
norm. 
One unfavorable circumstance inhibiting the emergence of a 
new scholarship norm like the one proposed here is that the existing 
normative framework, presented by the norms of academic integrity 
and against over-interpretation, is too weak to support its 
 
 163  See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 107, at 1282–83 (“[A]ttitudes matter . . . [one 
study has shown] a significant and positive correlation between whether an 
individual feels especially proud about being environmentally responsible and her 
level of recycling intensity.”). For an interesting discussion of how “social 
influences that might otherwise create pressure for individual and corporate carbon 
emissions reductions are undermined” by an “intergenerational information 
problem, see Vandenbergh & Raimi, supra note 70, at 142. 
 164  Lewis, supra note 2, at 610 (complaining about the danger posed to “the 
production of honest useful scholarship,” by “the prevalence of freely adopted 
faddishness, ideology, and opportunistic provocation in the selection of research 
topics”). 
 165  This discussion is largely drawn from Babcock, supra note 103, at 143–55.  
BABCOCK_READY_FOR_PRINTER_1 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/23/2015  9:15 AM 
2015 WHAT CAN BE DONE? 425 
attachment.166 This makes the emergence of a new norm 
considerably more difficult.167 Another unfavorable circumstance is 
that constraining scholarship in any way contradicts the more robust 
social norm of academic freedom.168 That norm encourages 
professors “to research, publish and teach” as they like.169  The norm 
reflects a strongly held belief that “[d]isinterested scholarship and 
research are both goods in themselves and benefits to society as a 
whole.”170 Since “[d]isciplined attempts to transcend received or 
popular opinions provide both weight and depth to academic 
discourse and to education,” and the time spent on academic pursuits 
“affirm[s] the worth of free inquiry,”171 arguably scholarship that 
transcends Professor Sax’s original vision of the modern public trust 
doctrine is a praise-worthy exercise of “free inquiry.” Moving from 
a social norm of uninhibited scholarship to one of more constrained 
application of prior ideas requires the abandonment of preconceived 
ideas about what is good scholarship, which is extremely hard to 
do.172 
The proposed norm also contradicts an equally robust 
individual norm of self-advancement, as it would defy the entire 
incentive structure of academic institutions like law schools, which 
favors bold scholarship and rewards it with tenure and promotion, 
among other incentives.173 Somewhat like a medieval guild, 
 
 166  Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 136, at 908 (“[T]he power or 
persuasiveness of a normative claim [] is explicitly tied to the ‘fit’ of that claim 
within existing normative frameworks.”). 
 167  Id. at 908 (discussing the importance of persuasive connections between 
existing norms and emergent norms). 
 168  See Aziz Huq, Easterbrook on Academic Freedom, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1055, 1055 (2010) (suggesting “an organizing principle for a constitutional 
jurisprudence of academic freedom”); see also Julius G. Getman & Jacqueline W. 
Mintz, Foreword: Academic Freedom in a Changing Society, 66 TEX. L. REV. 
1247, 1264 (1988) (noting that academic freedom “is an aspect and measure of 
society’s basic commitment to liberty, dissent, and freedom of debate, and it 
reflects the increasingly complex relationship between the university and 
society”). 
 169  Byrne, supra note 120, at 255. 
 170  See id. at 334; see also id. at 287 (“Academic freedom has taken firm root 
in American Society because of the widespread view that academic speech 
matters.”). 
 171  Id. at 287–88. 
 172  Babcock, supra note 103, at 143. 
 173  In fact, Lasson identifies “lack of moderation” as the root cause for the 
deluge of footnotes found in most articles, where modern scholars attempt to show 
their erudition through “both magnitude and multitude of bottom-matter.” Lasson, 
supra note 78, at 937, 940. 
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academics have created an internal framework of bureaucratic rules 
and procedures that culminate in the tenure system.174 That system 
ensures that “personnel decisions are based largely on scholarship 
and teaching ability,” as determined by the candidate’s peers, and is 
preserved under the rubric of academic freedom.175 If a candidate’s 
peers are engaged in immoderate scholarship, then that is likely to 
be rewarded with tenure, reinforcing the norm of self-
advancement.176 
In addition to the official institutional barriers to a norm of self-
restraint, scholars will observe that the behavior of their peers177 is 
exactly the opposite of careful moderation and consideration of the 
potential consequences of publication.178 If observed behavior is 
non-compliance with the proposed norm and is not remarked on 
negatively by legal scholars or held in disfavor by their institutions, 
 
 174  See generally Newman, supra note 146 (discussing how the academic guild 
constrains academic freedom). 
 175  See Byrne, supra note 120, at 310–11; see also id. at 311 (noting in addition 
that “[a]cademic freedom encompasses the tensions inherent in individuality and 
conformity, imagination and coherence, change and hierarchy”).  
 176  This results from faculty members controlling the appointment and tenure 
process and the natural desire to favor those who support their type of scholarship. 
See Stephen D. Sugarman, Conflicts of Interest in the Roles of University 
Professors, 6 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 255, 256–57 (2005) (“Faculty 
members judge other faculty in the course of the hiring and promotion processes 
and in connection with the granting of salary increases, awards, and honors. In 
addition, faculty members judge their colleagues through the peer review process 
that dominates much of academia—in connection with the publication of articles 
and books, the awarding of tenure, the awarding of competitive grants, and 
more.”); see also Farber, supra note 85, at 309 (“The point is that articles 
defending the legal status quo are much less likely to be published than articles 
attacking the status quo. The more sensible a legal rule, the less will be published 
supporting it, while articles cleverly attacking it often will be taken as brilliant 
insights. Thus, the law review literature will be dominated by articles taking silly 
positions, while the sensible positions held by most law professors usually will be 
underrepresented.”); id. at 310 (“Scholarship is expected to be original, and 
defense of the conventional wisdom provides few opportunities for brilliance. The 
professor seeking scholarly recognition is well-advised to steer away from the true 
but trite, in favor of the false but novel.”); see generally Gregory, supra note 84, 
at 993 (bemoaning the lowering of scholarship standards at law schools). 
 177  See supra notes 167–177 (discussing the institutional barriers to emergence 
of a new scholarship norm). 
 178  Hope M. Babcock, Why Changing Norms Is a More Just Solution to the 
Failed International Regulatory Regime to Protect Whales than a Trading 
Program in Whale Shares, 32 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 70 (2013) (“[C]hanging norms 
is not easy when there are no shared understandings and when it means abandoning 
previously acceptable behavior that has been engaged in so long that it has become 
its own norm.”). 
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there is little incentive for scholars to comply with it.179 If people 
perceive that they are not being treated fairly, that their good 
behavior is not being rewarded, or, as is more likely in the case of 
the public trust doctrine, that the bad behavior of others is not being 
sanctioned,180 then the impetus to adhere to a new norm of good 
behavior may be lessened.181 Given how long scholars have been 
expanding on Sax’s 1970 Michigan article with some success and 
little to no recrimination,182 it will be extremely difficult to have a 
contrary norm emerge that encourages a more constrained use of his 
proposal. 
The absence of a robust existing norm or normative framework, 
the existence of firmly embedded contrary norms, such as the 
personal norm of self-advancement, and observable, unpunished 
contrary behavior collectively and individually create unfavorable 
circumstances for the emergence of a new norm. Additionally, a 
new specific norm directing public trust scholars to treat the public 
trust doctrine cautiously would suffer from some of the debilitating 
problems that the two existing norms described above suffer, such 
as the existence of strong countervailing norms and enforcement 
difficulties. Still if a specific new norm could emerge, one calling 
for scholarly restraint, then it might overcome these problems and 
be effective. 
This Part of the Article has shown that it is unlikely that any 
norm, old or new, could constrain the behavior of second generation 
public trust scholars by itself. The next Part of the Article, therefore, 
discusses whether publication by external professional institutions 
 
 179  Social learning theory teaches “that observing unpunished inappropriate 
behavior reduces the inhibition to engage in that behavior . . . ‘Exposure to 
unpunished transgressions tends to increase prohibited behavior in observers,’” 
and undermine the social consensus behind the rule. Daniel W. Shuman, The 
Psychology of Deterrence in Tort Law, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 115, 158–59 (1993).  
 180  Vandenbergh, supra note 113 at 108 (“[T]hose parties that invest in 
compliance may react negatively if others do not and are not penalized . . . [, and] 
the parties that comply may perceive themselves as ‘dupes’ and their commitment 
to the law compliance norm may diminish.”). 
 181  Id. at 104 (“[P]eople who perceive that they are treated fairly feel respect 
and more readily adhere to other group norms.”). Vandenbergh calls this the 
reciprocity norm. Vandenbergh, supra note 112, at 1118–19 (defining the 
reciprocity norm as “the concept that an individual often will cooperate more than 
narrow rational actor models predict if the individual believes that others are 
cooperating or will cooperate”). 
 182  But see generally Huffman, A Fish out of Water, supra note 11; Lazarus, 
supra note 11.  
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of standards governing derivative scholarship might support the 
emergence of a new norm of scholarly restraint to discourage 
overextension of the public trust doctrine and encourage behavioral 
change by public trust scholars.183 
V. SCHOLARSHIP STANDARDS IMPOSED BY EXTERNAL INSTITUTIONS 
This Part examines whether the issuance of a hortatory standard 
by a professional organization like the Association of American 
Law Schools (AALS) discouraging scholarship that overextends its 
theoretical basis might provide the missing normative framework to 
which the proposed new academic norm of scholarly restraint might 
attach, allowing its emergence.184 Such a standard would also 
provide clarity on the content of the proposed new norm and would 
signal its importance to the community of concern—law faculty. 
The likelihood that such a norm might emerge might also improve 
if law schools rewarded scholarship that is compliant with this new 
norm the same way they reward scholarship that is not.185 For 
purposes of this analysis, the author assumes that such a standard 
has been adopted. 
Rules and standards can express and change social meaning.186 
Steneck argues that “[r]ules in the form of clearly defined best 
practices, combined with a reasonably detailed code of ethics for all 
research, would make a difference, particularly for fostering a sense 
of professional ethical responsibility.”187 They can create and shape 
 
 183   Cass Sunstein and others talk about a special type of non-governmental 
norm changer, the “norm entrepreneur.” Sunstein, supra note 154, at 909; see also 
Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 136, at 897 (“[Lawrence] Lessig uses the term 
‘meaning managers’ or ‘meaning architects’ to describe [individuals who] creat[e] 
norms and . . . social meaning.”). 
 184  Of course there is a risk, as Professor Post points out, “[l]eaning too far in 
the direction of standards, often measured in terms of what is known and accepted, 
poses a risk to new and innovative thinking.” Post, supra note 148, at 206. 
 185  See supra notes 84–93 (discussing academic incentives for scholars to write 
immoderately). 
 186  Vandenbergh, supra note 106, at 203 (“The law can express social meaning 
directly by taking positions on particular issues.”); see also Steneck, supra note 
115, at 536 (“At the very least, the lack of a clear code of conduct for research 
makes it difficult to foster ethical responsibility during the professional education 
of researchers.”). 
 187  Steneck, supra note 115, at 539; see also id. (“If truth, fairness, objectivity 
and the other general principles that are fundamental to all research, as well as to 
life in general, were self-evident in their application, then further explanation 
might not be necessary. The fact that they are not self-evident means that someone 
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information about desired behavior.188 A clear institutional standard 
established by the AALS could make it easier to determine when a 
violation of that norm has occurred.189 
Standards also have a signaling function,190 such that they can 
reinforce or change social understandings, which can affect the 
target population’s understanding about a problem and the social 
norms that develop in response to it.191 They signal a consensus in 
the affected community, here legal scholars, that behavior 
contradicting what is recommended in a standard is unacceptable, 
which, in turn, can strengthen and make more concrete an emergent 
norm like the one proposed here to write judiciously about a prior 
scholar’s idea.192 Perception of the existence of a consensus 
supporting the standard can also help internalize the new norm, 
which could in the future induce a scholar on the cusp of behaving 
incorrectly to refrain.193 A perception of universality may be 
 
has to help new researchers understand and embrace their responsibilities as 
professionals.”). 
 188  Vandenbergh, supra note 106, at 200 (quoting Dan M. Kahan, Social 
Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349 (1997)) 
(“[R]egulation of social meaning . . . include[s] ‘all the ways in which the law 
creates and shapes information about the kinds of behavior that members of the 
public hope for and value, as well as the kinds they expect and fear.’”). 
 189  See, e.g., AALS Bylaw § 6-6(c)(i), which requires law schools to recognize 
“creative scholarship in the appointment and advancement of members of the 
faculty,” as part of the school’s obligation to “maintain conditions conducive to 
the faculty’s effective discharge of its teaching and scholarly responsibilities,” 
might be modified to encourage restraint in the writing of derivative scholarship.  
 190  See Carlson, supra note 107, 1241 (citing ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND 
SOCIAL NORMS 24–25 (2000)) (“[I]n some contexts norms or behavior emerge as 
the result of numerous individuals signaling their propensity to cooperate in some 
behavior. If the signaling behavior becomes commonplace a norm may emerge.”). 
 191  Vandenbergh, supra note 106, at 201–02 (“[L]aw is expressive in the sense 
that it can signal, reinforce or change social meaning . . . , [and] the public can 
receive a message conveyed by law, whether intended or unintended, and that this 
message can have an impact on perceptions about the sources of a problem and on 
the social norms that develop in response to those perceptions.”). 
 192  Id. at 216 (“According to McAdams, the expressive function of laws can 
create or strengthen norms by signaling an existing societal consensus and by 
‘providing the concrete norms that define compliance with internalized abstract 
norms.’”); see also POSNER, supra note 190, at 43. However, the strength of the 
signal depends on the importance of contrary norms, like academic freedom or 
personal self-advancement and noncompliant behavior. See supra Parts III.B–III.C 
(discussing problems with existing norms). 
 193  Vandenbergh, supra note 113, at 75 (“[L]aws and enforcement actions may 
increase an individual decision-maker’s perceptions of the existence of a 
consensus regarding a norm. This perception may induce the individual to 
internalize the norm.”). Professional codes encourage ethical behavior similar to 
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particularly true in close-knit communities like the legal academy 
where, if enough people signal their intention to engage in the 
preferred behavior, the behavior can become the new norm.194 Thus, 
if the AALS were to publish a standard of scholarly restraint, it 
would send a strong signal to the rest of the legal academic 
community that contrary behavior is undesirable.195 
However, institutional standards, even hortatory ones, must be 
enforced in some way if they are to have any effect on behavior.196 
Though the norm of academic freedom would likely prevent any 
imposition of formal sanctions like fines or loss of privileges, some 
mechanism for enforcement is necessary to signal when a violation 
has occurred, and to lessen any incentive to violate the standard.197 
However, there are many forms of informal communications about 
unacceptable behavior far short of punitive sanctions, such as 
“advice, empathy, admonishment, shaming, stigmatization, 
confrontation, and retribution,”198 any of which might work alone or 
in combination199 in an academic setting, and any one of which can 
be imposed informally by the scholar’s home institution or peers.200 
 
that which might be induced by the existence of a law. See Steneck, supra note 
115, at 529 (“[T]he current approach to fostering professionalism and integrity in 
research relies heavily on universities, professional societies, journals and other 
local institutions to develop researchers’ sense of right or proper professional 
behavior—their professional ethical identity.”); see also id. at 536 (“Codes define 
the general principles that shape professional conduct.”). 
 194  Professor Miller applies this lesson to norm enforcement. See Geoffrey P. 
Miller, Norm Enforcement in the Public Sphere: The Case of Handicapped 
Parking, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 895, 907 (2003) (“In tight-knit communities, 
people might conspicuously enforce norms in order to earn the admiration of other 
members of the community, but this strategy is not effective in noncooperative 
settings.”). 
 195  See Steneck, supra note 115, at 539 (“Defining those responsibilities more 
clearly, across different fields of study, institutions and national boundaries, is the 
most practical and achievable way to begin the important task of fostering a sense 
of ethical professional responsibility in research.”). 
 196  See Miller, supra note 194, at 899 (“[T]here is the question of establishing 
a violation”). 
 197  See supra notes 180–182 and accompanying text. 
 198  See Miller, supra note 194, at 899. 
 199  See Babcock, supra note 103, at 155 (“[A] combination of approaches may 
be necessary, the precise combination or number of which may vary depending on 
the targeted behavior. The key is to pick approaches that will be ‘mutually 
enforcing’ and do not work at cross-purposes.”). 
 200  See Steneck, supra note 115, at 537–38 (explaining that “there is 
considerable room between loosely described ideals and ironclad rules to clarify 
best practices in research” and noting that before abuse in scientific research 
became a major concern, individual journals often set their own research 
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Assuming that the desired behavior is clear enough so a departure 
from it is easily understood, signaling even by a hortatory 
institutional standard could overcome many of the barriers to 
behavior change identified during the discussion of the persuasive 
power of norms. 
Thus, external institutional standards could play a role in both 
norm creation and behavior change without directly impinging on 
the dominant norm of academic freedom. Through signaling and the 
appearance of a supportive consensus behind what is desirable 
behavior, guidance from external academic accreditation 
institutions, like the AALS, might encourage adoption of a norm 
disfavoring overextension of prior scholars’ original ideas—here 
Professor Sax’s—beyond the point of their real world sustainability. 
However, since “[s]ocial meanings are collective goods, and 
collective action is needed . . . to change collective goods,”201 a 
norm of scholarly restraint may not emerge until academic 
institutions themselves change and start rewarding that behavior. 
Because incentives also signal desirable behavior, law schools could 
promote the norm by rewarding more moderate scholarship that 
takes an incremental consequentialist approach to prior scholarship. 
Together, norms, external professional standards, and internal 
institutional rewards favoring restraint could combine to extend the 
longevity of Professor Sax’s conception of the public trust doctrine 
as a useful gap filling tool and goad for law reform by the legislative 
and executive branches of government. If his warnings against 
overextending the doctrine are not heeded, courts may abandon it. 
This would jeopardize the continued existence of an extremely 
useful doctrine and squander a tool carefully crafted and refined by 
Professor Sax for future environmental scholars and activists. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has presented as a problem the tendency of legal 
scholars to overextend a prior scholar’s breakthrough idea either for 
personal gain within the legal academy or for more eleemosynary 
reasons like law reform. It uses as an example of this problem the 
derivative scholarship that followed Professor Sax’s 1970 Michigan 
Law Review article, in which he modestly suggested that the public 
 
guidelines). 
 201  Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 
943, 1022 (1995). 
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trust doctrine might fill gaps in environmental protection until 
protective laws were enacted.202 Since that article, many scholars, 
including the author, set out on a path of expanding the doctrine’s 
scope, as did the courts faced with disputes involving the public trust 
doctrine. Professor Sax worried that heedless expansion of the 
doctrine would dissuade courts from using it in the ways that he had 
intended—not to revolutionize the American legal landscape, but to 
place-hold until legislatures took the steps he was confident they 
would to protect threatened natural resources.203 
The Article suggests that law professors who feel compelled to 
expand upon the writings of prior legal scholars to justify their own 
contribution to the scholarly literature should think critically about 
the impact their writings may have on the original idea, lest they 
unintentionally jeopardize the achievement of the initial author’s 
goal. This is not to discourage derivative scholarship, but merely to 
suggest that it should be informed by the original author’s concerns 
and that these should be cast aside only when the benefits of the 
extension are warranted. 
This has not happened in the case of the public trust doctrine. 
Today, the doctrine is almost completely unmoored from Professor 
Sax’s 1970 article, and public trust scholars continue to expand the 
doctrine further.204 Given that this trend may ultimately undermine 
the doctrine’s sustainability, this Article has considered whether the 
academic norms of academic integrity or the avoidance of rhetorical 
excess might moderate the enthusiasm of scholars to continue the 
doctrine’s expansion. However, the internal weaknesses of these 
norms—the fact that it is hard to determine when they have been 
 
 202  Sax, supra note 3, at 565 (“This Article has been an extended effort to make 
the rather simple point that courts have an important and fruitful role to play in 
helping to promote rational management of our natural resources.”). 
 203  Sax, supra note 3, at 558–59 (describing the role of the courts in 
democratizing the administrative process “by calling upon the legislature to make 
an express and open policy decision on the matter in question . . . The closer a 
court can come to thrusting decision making upon a truly representative body—
such as by requiring a legislature to determine an issue openly and explicitly—the 
less a court will involve itself in the merits of a controversy”); see also Sax, supra 
note 19, at 194 (Courts “can assure that decisions made by mere administrative 
bodies are not allowed to impair trust interest in the absence of explicit, fully 
considered legislative judgments. Under the rubric of legislative remand, courts 
can also press a legislature to fortify its decisions with a full consideration of less 
disruptive solutions”). 
 204  See, e.g., supra notes 67–68 (describing some of the recent writings by 
Professor Mary Christina Wood, a noted public trust scholar). 
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violated and their implementation might even result in stifling 
creativity—make them of limited use.205 It is equally unlikely that a 
new norm of academic restraint might emerge on its own, because, 
among other reasons, existing norms are too weak to support it, 
contrary behavior is rarely if ever seen punished, and there are 
firmly embedded contrary norms such as academic freedom and 
self-advancement.206 
The only hope for reforming academic behavior lies in the 
AALS proposing a hortatory standard encouraging academic 
restraint. Such a standard could, by signaling the importance of 
compliant behavior, encourage the emergence of a new norm of 
academic restraint. As only a hortatory standard and not a 
requirement, it should not trigger the oppositional norm of academic 
freedom. Nonetheless, through signaling, it might encourage 
behavioral change. 
Professor Sax gave the next generation of scholars and 
litigators a tool, the modern public trust doctrine—a modest little 
tool that could be used to protect resources held in trust for all the 
people from being converted to some private use, and that might 
democratize government in the process. He only asked that the 
doctrine be used carefully, lest its power be squandered. Over the 
years, lawyers and scholars like the author have successfully, albeit 
heedlessly, advocated for the doctrine’s expansion. This Article has 
suggested the danger of going too far. There should, perhaps, be 
some limit to legal ingenuity when there is a risk of adverse societal 
consequences. 
The loss of the public trust doctrine as a tool to protect the 
environment would be a serious loss. Therefore, public trust 
scholars and litigators should consider curbing their enthusiasm for 
the doctrine as an environmental cure-all, and respect the bounds 
Professor Sax placed on the doctrine’s use. We should use his gift 
wisely and only breach those limits after weighing the risks of our 
actions against the benefits of stretching the doctrine yet one more 
time. 
 
 
 205  See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing the norm of academic integrity and some 
problems with its application to overextending a prior scholar’s original work) and 
Part III.B.2 (discussing the norm against rhetorical excesses and problems with its 
application). 
 206  See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing these and other problems with an 
emergent new norm of academic restraint). 
